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INTRODUCTION
Should we cabin democracy to advance environmental protection? It's
a more complicated question than it seems, and this Article will argue the
answer is "no." However, given the direction of some environmental
activism and scholarship today, one might think that turning some degree
away from democracy is the best option for combating environmental
problems.1 Vast scholarly literatures and prominent advocacy campaigns
* Assistant Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. I have
workshopped and shared this Article extensively and I owe thanks to so many. First to Mike
Vandenbergh who literally made this Article possible and offered invaluable insights that, like Mike
himself, were kind, generous, and unmatched in their helpfulness. Thanks also to: Carliss Chatman
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search for practical solutions to get beyond the conflicts that confound
environmental lawmaking.2 The unpleasant conflict hese efforts seek to
avoid is politics. Politics is vile, or incompetent, or both, or at least
entirely unproductive. And so the bellow of anti-politics swells.
Politics, though, is part of the practice of democracy. It is part of the
collective decision making about who has the ability to structure and
control coercive power. Any effort to solve public problems without
politics is simultaneously an effort to solve them without, or with less,
democracy, without distributed, formal control over exercises of power.
Perhaps a turn from democracy is what we prefer, but it is not a choice
we should make without acknowledgment and clear-eyed analysis.
This Article has a simple but challenging goal: to demonstrate that
democratic practice is not only necessary for the legitimate exercise of
state power, but also for the legitimate exercise of certain private powers,
specifically, private environmental governance (PEG). PEG is an
emerging practice and scholarly paradigm that aims to address
environmental concerns without resorting to political, and therefore
democratic, practices. Definitionally, PEG strives for public goals, such
as climate change mitigation, through private dealings rather than
government coercion.3 When Walmart insists its suppliers reduce waste
in their packaging,4 or when firms multi-laterally establish a non-profit to
certify sustainable fisheries and then agree to source only certified
and Maybell Romero; Doug Kysar; Jim Salzman and participants in the UCLA-University of
Colorado environmental law workshop, including Ann Carlson, William Boyd, Heather Payne,
Monte Mills, Sharon Jacobs, Felix Moorman, Tony Arnold, Ann Eisenberg, Mike Pappas, Steph
Tai, and Kerrigan Bork; participants at Vermont Law School's 2019 Environmental Scholarship
Colloquium, particularly Tom Lininger, Laura Mott, Jonathan Rosenbloom, Cale Jaffe, Tom
McHenry, and Timothy Malloy; scholars at the 2020 University of Arizona environmental
workshop, Sharon Jacobs (again), Mike Pappas (again), David Adelman, Alex Klass, Bruce Huber,
Katy Kuh, Dave Owen, Shi-Ling Hsu, Sanne Knudsen, Todd Aagaard, and Cliff Villa; participants
AALS 2020 administrative and environmental law section workshops, Emily Hammond, Donald
Kochan, Kristin Hickman, Andy Grewal, Bridget Dooling, Anthony Moffa, Steve Gold, Sarah Fox,
Mike Gerrard, Richard Lazarus and Robin Craig. Finally, thank you to Mike Gerrard (again), Jim
Salzman (again), Alex Klass (again), and other participants in Columbia Law School's Sabin
Colloquium on Innovative Environmental Scholarship, Greg Dotson, Vanessa Casado Perez, Conor
Dwyer Reynolds, Tara Righetti, Wyatt Sassman, Kristin van de Biezenbos, David Wright, and Pat
Parenteau.
1 See, e.g., Joshua Ulan Galperin, Board Rooms and Jail Cells: Assessing NGO Approaches to
Private Environmental Governance, 71 ARK L. REv. 403, 404-405, 408 (2018) (comparing two
NGOs to show how their different philosophies are both grounded in private environmental
governance (PEG) and then reviewing the legal literature about PEG) [hereinafter Board Rooms
and Jail Cells].
2 Part II, infra.
3 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 133
(2013) [hereinafter Vanderbergh, Private Environmental Governance]; Part II, infra.
4 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Walmart Effect: The Role ofPrivate Contracting in Global
Governance, 54 UCLA. L. REv. 913, 927 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Walmart].
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seafood,' that is PEG. The instrumental impacts of PEG are huge,
particularly with respect to climate change,6 and the real potential of
government action to achieve the same emissions reductions is, so far,
bleak.i That is a clear, loud, and unimpeachably powerful call to PEG.
The PEG literature has carefully catalogued examples and successes,'
analyzed how the study of PEG both diverges from, 9 and runs parallel
to, 10 traditional environmental scholarship, and mused on the mechanisms
of accountability in PEG." What PEG scholarship has yet to do is
consider the PEG endeavor not simply as an option beyond, or
complementary to, state-led governance, but as an essential part of the
larger democratic ecosystem in which society does not just choose
policies and goals, but, through the process of political interaction, shapes
the collective will from which policies and goals emerge." In that
political ecosystem, PEG is not just an addition to traditional, state-led,
public governance. Instead, PEG's authority has an influence on public
governance. To take a simple abstract example, PEG may provide proof
of concept for an environmental policy that then allays fears of
burdensome government directives. Or, conversely, PEG may distract
from efforts to develop effective government regulation.13 Whatever the
case, we need more critical study of these political interactions between
private and public environmental policy.
This Article thus seeks not to indict PEG, but to fill a gap. The PEG
literature asserts that PEG must work alongside public governance but
has yet to fully consider and detail why that is true, why PEG and public
governance are both essential, and why the former should not replace the
latter. This Article explains why PEG is important, but also why we must
consider whether it lacks critical features of public governance. The
overarching answer to why private governance cannot supplant public
governance is that the very distinction of public versus private is
5 Id. at 923.
6 MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2018).
7 Id. at 4.
8 Eg., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 147-56.
9 Eg., Vandenbergh, Walmart, supra note 4, at 915.
10 Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance,
5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2015).
11 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 383-92.
12 Vandenbergh does consider the interplay between PEG and public governance. Vandenbergh,
Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 197-198. But his consideration is an
instrumental one that understandably leaves out larger questions of democratic theory. Part V of
this Article further addresses this distinction.
13 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jim Rossi, & Ian Faucher, The Gap-Filling Role of Private
Environmental Governance, 38 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2020).
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unsatisfactory and cannot support approaching each form of governance
as fundamentally different. Thus, this Article tries to prove that private
environmental governance pulls all the same democratic triggers as
public governance. These triggers are politics, choice, and liberty.
The first trigger for democracy is politics. PEG scholarship has been
too quick to dismiss the role of PEG as a form of politics (and politics as
part of democracy). Although the study of PEG has been largely
descriptive-explaining that PEG is worthy of study, can achieve
significant impacts, and is a cohesive field"-it also makes a bold
normative claim: in the absence of state-led solutions, private solutions
are essential." More forcefully, PEG promises not only a solution in lieu
of politics, but a way to get "beyond politics."16
The weakness in this normative claim is that it implies too simple a
notion of politics. It seems, from the promise to move beyond politics,
that politics is merely argument about the affirmative action of
government. But politics is a central part of democracy. Politics
encompasses the ntire array of public decision making, affirmative and
negative, electoral and rhetorical, majoritarian and deliberative, state and
non-state.17 Politics is not just the operations of the state; it is the
operations of the people in formulating ends and means.18 It is the
ecosystem of behaviors, both nominally public and private, that influence
collective action.19 This conception of democratic politics includes the
retrospective accountability of elections but also the preliminary impulses
of idea formation, justification, and debate.
As far as PEG promises to eschew politics, it is promising to avoid
existing democratic fora for public decision making, and that avoidance,
coupled with broad powers over natural resources, is exactly what gives
PEG its largely unobstructed instrumental power. This is all politics.
Politics is the entire emergent process of collective decision making.
Democracy is the more discrete and formal aspects of that process,
including voting, suing, petitioning, commenting, and legal reasoning,
among other state-protected avenues of participation. In other words,
when I say "politics" I generally mean the process of governing,
particularly the process of debating policy. When I say "democracy," I
generally mean a system of government in which authority originates
14 E.g., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3.
15 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 8.
16 Id. at 1.
17 See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY (Melvin L. Rogers ed., Penn State Press 2012).
18 See RICHARDSON, infra note 23, at 136 (distinguishing between what the public wants to
achieve and how the public wants to achieve it).
19 See David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 32, 33 (2003).
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with the governed. Democracy is formal and ontological while politics is
informal and practical. As I will argue, in a democratic state, politics is
part of democratic practice because how people choose to govern within
the formal structures (democracy) is shaped by the informal processes of
governing (politics).
Given that this Article makes a case for considering PEG in light of
democracy, I go slightly beyond just a simple definition of democracy. I
also briefly sketch a broad vision of democracy, asserting that American
democracy includes majoritarian direction and accountability, liberal
individual participation, reason-giving, and deliberation.
With the rise of nationalistic and arguably tyrannical populism around
the world, this is an inauspicious time to sing the praises of, or in fact to
demand, democracy. 20 But two imperatives urge us not to turn away from
democracy. First, many of the real failings that we attach to democracy
are, in fact, failings of populism and majoritarianism, not of a more
complete democracy.21 With the robust, inclusive, and constrained
democracy that I have just sketched and will further describe, we may
avoid the pitfalls of majoritarianism. Second, even if we accept that
democracy has failed, we have to grapple very seriously with the question
of whether academics or corporate leaders can justly wave away
democracy, even deeply flawed or failing democracy. That requires either
great power or great hubris. The question thus becomes whether private
environmental governance is a dismissal of democracy in this vein.
The second trigger for democracy is the need for collective choice.
When PEG scholarship asserts that private industry can achieve essential
environmental protection, it is accurate. However, it takes for granted that
environmental protection is a shared goal and that the specific tools
private actors employ are broadly desirable. In other words, PEG takes
for granted a prerequisite of any public policy: choice. The pursuit of
collective welfare should be a collective decision, not a fate imposed
upon the public.
Environmental protection has long labored under the illusion of fate,
of neutral principles like a balance of nature, welfare maximization, or
mystical providence.22 These principles pretend to relieve the public from
20 E.g., Yasmeen Serhan, Populism is Morphing in Insidious Ways, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 6,
2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/01/future-populism-2020s/604393/;
On Tyranny, Populism-and How to Best Respond Today, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 30, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/30/on-tyranny-populism-and-how-best-to-
respond-today.
21 E.g., Serhan, supra note 20.
22 JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE 264 (2015) [hereinafter PURDY, AFTER NATURE]. See also, Jody Freeman, The
[Vol. 39:7074
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making choices, at least from making the hardest choices about which
goals to pursue. But these principles amount to little in a world that is
marked by irreducible contestability23 and the undeniable consequences
of human choices.24 Put differently, "[e]nvironmental policy making is a
choice among futures." 5 When PEG promises a less contested path to
one particular future, it masks the important choices that we should make,
chief among them, the choice of what future we want. If we have
collective choices to make, how do we go about making them? The
answer is politics, which on some level is just a disagreeable synonym
for democracy.26 While the PEG scholarship looks at how firms
successfully govern, for the most part it does not look at how people,
through democracy and the state, govern firms.2 7 This Article is a step
toward that deeper democratic onsideration of PEG.
The third trigger for democracy is liberty. Democracy becomes
especially important when substantial power imbalances allow some to
interfere with or dominate others. Non-interference and non-domination
are two competing formations of liberty.28 In the case of PEG, the leading
firms both interfere with and dominate the public's interaction with the
natural world.29 Again, were firms engaged in PEG not able to interfere
and dominate then their PEG would be of little value. It is only because
some firms have the power to control global resources that their
engagement in environmental governance amounts to anything.
As with so much else in this Article, the key to thinking about liberty
is dismissing the public-private distinction. The state has the power to
constrict liberty in myriad ways. That power is acceptable to the extent
that the interference or domination is democratically authorized or the
power is democratically revoked. Non-state actors also have power to
interfere and dominate and so there is reason to use democracy to
authorize or revoke that power.
Non-state actors could possibly provide for many of the same aspects
of democracy that a state could provide. As I will argue in a companion
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 566 (2000) (writing that there is no
"natural ordering" that provides easy distinctions between, for example, public and private.).
23 HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS
OF POLICY 35-36 (2002).
24 PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra note 22, at 16-17.
25 Id. at 264.
26 Part 111, infra.
27 But see, Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L.
REv. 137, 140 (2019); and to a lesser extent, Light & Orts, supra note 10.
28 Part VI, infra.
29 Id.
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article, however, on the whole it does not.30 As a result, PEG is at the
same time effective and undemocratic. As long as PEG, just like public
governance, impacts collective choice, individual liberty, and the
distribution of power, it is a problem to do so without democracy.31
When I say that PEG needs democracy, I mean that in two distinct
ways. First, PEG itself, the individual firms aiming to reduce their
environmental impact and the conservation projects of those firms,
should strive to include more opportunities for majoritarian direction,
individual participation, reason-giving, and deliberative decision making.
This would be progress. It may also be unrealistic and would certainly be
too little. Second, it is important to recognize that the democratic state
also has the power to shape PEG and govern it from the outside. The most
complete way to inj ect democracy into PEG is to use the democratic state
to ensure that the power of PEG is only what we want it to be. PEG may
be denominated as a private action but the key theme here is that the
denomination makes little real difference.
In rejecting any fundamental distinction between public and private
spheres, this Article instead uses the terms to reflect general practice and
expectations, in which "public" invokes notions of either widespread
concern or state-centered action, while "private" means non-state control.
This distinction signals that state and non-state alike may impact
individual liberty because both wield real, meaningful, and identifiable
power. But PEG is a slight of hand when it comes to that power. It inspires
us to look away from the functional distribution of power and toward the
flamboyant triumphs and impressive opportunities of private
undertakings. While we look in that direction we may fail to see and
debate the existence of coercive power, the extent of that power, or even
the process by which that power is wielded.32 When power is dominant
or coercive, regardless of its source, it calls for democratic consideration,
at least.33
The Article begins the case for assessing PEG's democratic
qualifications first, in the next section, by carefully explaining what PEG
is and then, in Section II, by briefly defining democracy in order to give
30 Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Public Role in Private Governance (forthcoming) (manuscript at
5) (on file with author).
31 GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5 (1967).
32 See id. at 55-57.
33 Id. at 356 ("[O]ne of the genuine necessities of politics [is] the necessity to recognize power
where it exists and to coopt it for the minimum needs of the large[r] society.") ; see generally,
THEODORE J. LOwI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
xix (40th ann. ed. 2010) (arguing that government hides its coercive authority by delegating
decision making to private actors and technocrats, thereby cutting off the possibility of transparent
and open conversation about the use of coercion, but not cutting off the actual coercion).
[Vol. 39:7076
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context to the remainder of the analysis. The following sections
essentially make the point that the public-private distinction alone cannot
answer the democratic question. The distinction is too flimsy. Should one
argue "but we don't need democracy because PEG is private action," the
following sections assert that the private designation does not help
because PEG is political, it avoids collective decision making, and it is
coercive. Environmental governance, whether or not we call it "private,"
must be democratic governance. To that end, Section III shows why PEG
is a political endeavor that forcefully impacts public governance and
popular preferences. Section IV explains the deep and important choices
that environmental protection poses and argues that we must rely on
democracy to make those choices because there are no easy or automatic
tools for environmental decision making. Section V illustrates how non-
state behavior can interfere and dominate, can coerce, individuals and
therefore impact individual liberty in the same way as state governance.
Because PEG is not disconnected from individual liberty, there is a need
for individuals to have some meaningful control. Section VI concludes
by considering how we draw the line between those private undertakings
that demand democracy and those that can proceed without. That line is
hard to draw, but much PEG falls clearly on the side of democracy.
In short, the lesson of this Article is that PEG is a democratic
participant, not a bystander. For that reason, it should be subject to
democratic practice. In a companion piece I will argue that, as it stands,
PEG has a democracy deficit, but we can mitigate that deficit and seek
democratic oversight through traditional forms of state governance.34
I. PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
That private firms can and do make environmental decisions outside
the scope of public regulation is not news. As I drafted this Article, from
the window of my office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, I could see the
impacts of U.S. Steel's environmental decisions, made without the
commands of regulation as early as 1901.35 The company likely did not
make those early decisions with "environmental stewardship" explicitly
in mind, but the coke they burned, the solid waste they released, and the
water they used all contributed to widespread environmental impacts.36
Today, U.S. Steel is explicit about its environmental impacts, its ability
34 Galperin, The Public Role in Private Governance, supra note 30.
35 See generally KENNETH WARREN, BIG STEEL: THE FIRST CENTRUY OF THE UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION, 1901-2001 7 (2008).
36 E.g., Andrea Di Schino, Environmental Impact of Steel Industry in HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MATERIAL MANAGEMENT (Chaudhery Mustansar Hussain ed., 2019).
1 ] 77
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
to make decisions that ripple far beyond the borders of its facilities.37 For
instance, the company promises to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
because it recognizes that those emissions contribute to governing the
global climate.38 The decisions they made in 1901 were as much private
environmental governance as their decisions today.
What is new today is the framing and study of private environmental
decisions as a cohesive field of governance worthy of pursuit and study,
as well as the scale of explicit private initiatives. Within the legal
literature, the credit for this innovation goes to Michael Vandenbergh,
who first introduced the issue in 2007 when he wrote principally of
Walmart's efforts to provide public environmental benefits using supply-
chain contracts requiring better environmental performance from its
suppliers.39 In 2013 Professor Vandenbergh went a step further and
formally defined the field in an article simply titled Private
Environmental Governance.4 That paper carefully defined PEG, offered
a PEG typology with leading examples, distinguished PEG from
traditional environmental governance, and anticipated a number of
objections to the new field of study." With the field of PEG open for
discussion, Sarah Light and Eric Orts offered the next major innovation
in 2015 when they explored the "parallels" between the policy
instruments available in both public and private environmental
governance4 and recommended considering the normative implications
of instrument choice.43 Many others have begun exploring PEG," but
Vandenbergh remains the dean and leader of the field. In 2018 he
published, along with colleague Jonathan Gilligan, the book on the
subject, Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate
Change.4 5 To fully understand PEG, any reader must consult, at least,
these major publications. This section, nevertheless, will first attempt to
briefly summarize them and highlight a few practical examples.
37 See U.S. STEEL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 10-11, 29-43 (2019), https://www.ussteel.com/
documents/40705/43725/U.+S.+Steel+2019+Sustainability+Reportweb.pdf/52f7fb7e-a2aa-
c80b-7d72-202afc5ab5ff?t=1603766679756.
38 Id. at 39-43.
39 Vandenbergh, Walmart, supra note 4, at 925-28.
40 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3.
41 Id. at 129-30.
42 Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance,
5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 13 (2015).
43 Id. at 54.
44 E.g., Joshua Ulan Galperin, Foreword: Private, Environmental, Governance, 9 GEO. WASH.
J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2018) (introducing a range of new PEG scholarship included in a new
symposium publication) [hereinafter Galperin, Foreword].
45 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6.
[Vol. 39:7078
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A. Defining Private Environmental Governance
Private environmental governance is "private-private interactions" that
produce standards for environmental behavior and thus control
environmental quality46 "without the coercive force [] of government."4 7
PEG is "private actors perform[ing] traditionally governmental roles,
such as reducing negative externalities and managing public goods or
common pool resources."48
To understand the profound nature of this definition is to understand
the traditional framing of environmental governance, the rate at which
traditional environmental governance is not happening, and the rate at
which private environmental governance is happening.
"If you took an introductory environmental law class at almost any law
school, read almost any environmental law casebook or undergraduate
policy textbook, read the 300 or more environmental law articles
published every year, or followed environmental policy debates in the
mass media, you would be fully justified in believing" that environmental
governance is the stuff of legislative statutes detailed through
administrative regulation and enforcement.49 The success and failure of
environmental law is seemingly measured by government policy. It was
a great environmental success when President Obama announced his
administration's Clean Power Plan.50 It was a great failure when President
Trump announced his repeal of that same policy.51 Since 1970 when the
National Environmental Policy Act became the first modern
environmental law," we have gauged environmental success by new laws
and new actions under those laws. 13
Today new laws are exceedingly rare. After the passage of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress has passed just one major
environmental law, a revision to the Toxic Substance Control Act in
46 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 133.
47 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 124.
48 Id. at 121.
49 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 130.
50 Press Release, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Plan, White House
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-
president-announcing-clean-power-plan
51 Press Release, Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule,
Ensuring Reliable, Diversified Energy Resources while Protecting our Environment (Jun. 19,
2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ensuring-
reliable-diversified-energy
52 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (2019).
53 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 131.
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2016.5" It seems that this rare congressional action is the exception that
proves the rule that we are in an age of "statutory inaction," an age that
has lasted longer than the age of action that ran from 1970 through 1990."5
Despite so much inaction, there is still an "assumption that government
must be the actor that responds to" environmental concerns.5 6
According to Vandenbergh, the assumption is rooted in the way
environmental law is taught and discussed,57 but it does not reflect the
reality in which private organizations are achieving important emissions
reductions.58 For example, with respect to climate change, private
initiatives could reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions more than 3
billion tons annually over the next decade.59 To put this number in
context, meeting the leading international goal for climate reduction
would require global annual reductions of 5 billion tons each year.60 The
possibility of PEG gets us significantly closer to that goal. The next part
will sketch out a few examples of the types of private initiatives that make
up this striking potential.
B. Private Environmental Governance in Practice
PEG in practice does not look entirely different from public
environmental governance. That, along with its massive potential, is what
makes PEG so important.
Professors Sarah Light and Eric Orts explain that the traditional tools
of public governance are the same tools scholars observe in PEG.61 A
memorable mnemonic for remembering the key environmental policy
instruments is James Salzman's "Five P's."62 The Five P's-prescriptive
regulation, property rights, penalties, payments, and persuasion-are the
basic elements that make up environmental governance.63 With some
tweaks to the mnemonic, Light and Orts demonstrate that PEG uses these
same elements.64 For example, where government compels private firms
to use a particular emissions reduction technology-prescription-
54 Assessing and Managing Chemicals Under TSCA: The FrankR. Lautenberg Chemical Safety
for the 21st Century Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-
managing-chemicals-under-tsca/frank-r-lautenberg-chemical-safety-21 st century-act.
55 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 131.
56 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 3.
57 Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 130-31.
58 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 3.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 6.
61 Light & Orts, supra note 10, at 4.
62 James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P's, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. F. 363, 363-64 (2013).
63 Id. at 364.
64 Light & Orts, supra note 10, at 13.
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private organizations might similarly require the most environmentally
advanced technology.65 A private firm that certifies the environmental
benefits of buildings could, for instance, require that any firm seeking
certification use only the most efficient HVAC systems.66 Where
government creates private property rights and private individuals are
expected to act in the best interest of their own property, private firms
may similarly distribute rights throughout the firm, for example, by
allocating water to different divisions so that each division has an
incentive to use water more efficiently.67
Where PEG differs more from public governance is that it occurs in a
more crowded field, not with one state, or even a few states, but hundreds
or thousands of non-state participants. When household and individual
behavior is incorporated into the PEG fold, the practice engages literally
billions of actors.68 Likewise, while the power of major industries over
environmental resources is coercive with respect to the environment,
private firms do not always have coercive authority over business
partners the way government has coercive authority over regulated
parties.
These public-private distinctions help frame the two major types of
PEG: bilateral and multilateral action.69 Bilateral action, or bilateral
standard setting,70 occurs when two parties agree to environmental
practices that the government does not set or mandate.7 1 The paradigm of
bilateral action is supply chain contracts, in which "corporate buyers
impose environmental requirements on their global suppliers."2 But
bilateral standard setting may also arise in the form of mergers and
acquisitions, loans, or insurance policies,3 as well as good neighbor
agreements in which a firm with a major local environmental footprint
agrees with a local community to abide by certain non-governmental
standards.74
Multilateral standard setting is even more indicative of the scope of
PEG. In a multilateral project, firms across an industry agree to abide by
65 Id. 24-26.
66 See id at 28.
67 See id. at 31.
68 The World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2021).
69 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 146-47.
70 Id. at 148.
71 Id. at 156.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 158.
74 Id. at 161; see also Kristen van de Biezenbos, Enforcing Private Environmental Governance
Standards Through Community Contracts, 9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 45, 47 (2018).
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shared environmental standards.75 Certification systems are the epitome
here. A certification system often begins with a new organization, which
engages stakeholders to create environmental standards.76 Firms that are
willing to follow those standards may apply to certify their products (or
processes, buildings, or other environmentally relevant components) and
display the certification as a demonstration of their pro-environment
behavior.7? Lending standards are another multilateral effort in which
"major banks agree to impose [a collaborative set of environmental
standards] on project finance borrowers .... "78 Disclosure standards
emerge when organizations form to "gather and disseminate
environmental information" about leading corporations.79
The leading examples of PEG touch all parts of this typology.
Walmart, in particular, has been at the forefront of PEG literature and
praise.80 In partnership with the Environmental Defense Fund, an
environmental advocacy group, Walmart is using bilateral supply chain
contracts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 1 billion tons between
2015 and 2030.81 Walmart also sells only Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC) certified seafood.82 MSC is a multi-lateral certification program.8 3
Unilever, an international consumer goods corporation, and the World
Wildlife Fund, an environmental advocacy group, formed MSC to create
and administer fisheries standards.84 Only seafood that meets the MSC
requirements is eligible for the MSC label, a now easily recognizable blue
and white silhouetted fish with an impressionistic "check" mark making
up its dorsal (fish speak for "top") side.85 The label garners higher
visibility, better reputation, and market access.86 The Forest Stewardship
Council provides an analogue in the forest products industry.87
PEG is not just for global corporations like Walmart. Yale University,
for example, is planning for climate change and trying to reduce its own
75 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 148-56.
76 Id. at 148-49.
77 Id. at 149-50.
78 Id. at 151.
79 Id. at 155.
80 E.g., Vandenbergh, Walmart, supra note 4; Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, supra note 3, at 150; VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 3.
81 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 178.
82 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 150.
83 Id. at 149; see also MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/ (last visited Feb.
6, 2021).
84 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 149.
85 Id.; MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
86 Why Get Certified, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/for-business/
fisheries/why-get-certified (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
87 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 148-49.
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carbon footprint. 88 To achieve this goal the university has implemented
an internal carbon charge, which measures emissions from each building
on campus and imposes a $40 per metric ton charge to the administrative
unit that operates the building.89 The program does not change the
University's overall budget, but it provides an incentive for individual
units of the school to improve their own environmental performance.
Each unit must pay for its own emissions but is also eligible to have the
university reimburse the unit if its buildings outperform the rest of the
University.90
Also distinct from global corporations are non-profit environmental
groups. On first blush these groups appear to fall outside the typical
definition of "private," because they are membership-based non-profits,
but they nevertheless advance non-state environmental protection.91 The
Nature Conservancy (TNC), for example, purchases and manages land
for the purpose of protecting it in perpetuity.92 Activist NGO Greenpeace
likewise engages in private governance by using visible and aggressive
reputational campaigns against firms it wants to improve.93 These are
both examples of participating in the marketplace to effect environmental
change. But many NGOs also play a more tangential role, for example,
consulting with private businesses to help them change their
environmental behavior. 9
C. Why Private Environmental Governance?
Why do private firms voluntarily work towards government-like
environmental protection goals? In part because their initiatives can deter
environmental regulation, in part because there is a self-interested
economic benefit from distinctive market behavior, in part because more
corporate efficiency is as good for the bottom line as it is for the
environment, and in part because some corporate leaders personally
support environmental action.95
88 Yale Carbon Charge Project Overview, YALE UNIV., https://carbon.yale.edu/project-
overview (last visited February 6, 2021); Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental
Markets within the Firm, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 19, 2015), http://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2015/05/19/the-new-insider-trading-environmental-markets-within-the-firm/.
89 Yale Carbon Charge, Implementation, YALE UNIV., https://carbon.yale.edu/implementation.
90 Id.
91 Board Rooms and Jail Cells, supra note 1, at 405.
92 Id. at 433-35.
93 Id. at 435-37.
94 Id. at 460.
95 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 392-93; Coglianese & Nash, infra note 133, at
238-39.
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Whether it is market factors or personal leadership preferences that
drive PEG initiatives, it is plain that the driver is something other than
direct government mandates or formal democratic institutions. It is plain
that something other than state democracy is controlling major aspects of
the global climate and global environment. The preferences of corporate
leadership may align with popular or particular political goals. But the
personal initiatives of CEOs-initiatives that may end up influencing, for
instance, fresh water availability, global temperatures, wholesale collapse
or maintenance of essential food supplies-are nevertheless fiat.
Benevolent fiat, perhaps.
Environmental decisions that arise from widespread market signals or
attempts to lower costs may likewise lead to a greener world while also
pleasing consumers and investors.96 But "consumer" and "investor" are
not synonyms for "voter" and "citizen." The power of consumers and
investors comes from their paychecks, not from their personhood.97
Economic power can and should be a driver of change, but it is not, alone,
democratic.
Economic encouragements and leadership initiatives are not, in
themselves, democratic, but they are tied to democratic government in a
number of ways. First, PEG can fill gaps that state inaction leaves open.98
Second, by entering the public consciousness, by influencing how we
think about environmental protection, by changing the debate around and
the costs of environmental governance, PEG can powerfully influence the
reality of state action-it can widen the gaps that it purports to fill. This
political economy hints that PEG is fundamentally tied to public decision
making and demands democratic attention. But before we can fully
understand the case for why PEG calls for a democratic reassessment, it
is necessary to have a slightly deeper understanding of "democracy" in
this context.
II. DEMOCRACY
A more thorough understanding of democracy will contextualize the
thrust of this Article-that PEG should be subject to democratic
practice-and the goal of this section is to provide a working definition.
96 See generally DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART
COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (Wiley Paperback ed., 2009).
97 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Graham Downey, & D. Lee Miller, Eating is Not PoliticalAction, 13
J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 113, 114-15 (2017).
98 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 131-33; Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Jim Rossi, & Ian Faucher, The Gap-Filling Role of Private Environmental
Governance, 38 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2020).
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The section does not explain some fundamental truth about democracy at
large, but instead illustrates the practical structure of the robust vision of
democracy within the constitutional system of the United States. A
realization that "democracy" is more complete, inclusive, just, and
complex than mere majoritarianism, more than mere voting and elections,
should ease the worries of those who are skeptical of the overall project
because they see democracy as part of the problem rather than part of the
solution.
Arguably, mere majoritarianism has long been emblematic of
democracy.99 In this view, democracy is simply soliciting eligible voters
for their preferences and then granting those with the most popular
preference the right to govern. 100 That is clean, simple, and it reflects the
fact that elections are highly visible.1 and motivating. 102 But in the United
States' constitutional democracy, there is more at play than voting. 103
Democracy is indeed about public participation, and voting is indeed a
part of public participation, but democracy also includes individual
participation, reason-giving, and deliberation as critical elements.
In the formal procedures of democracy, majoritarian participation
happens through voting.104 Voting allows people to select representatives
to govern,105 making it an impetus for policy, it is the means through
which these representatives themselves make formal decisions in
Congress,106 making it a tool of governing, and it allows the public to
99 Eg., JEAN-JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, (trans. G. D. H. Cole ed. 2002)
(1762), https://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Rousseaucontrat-social.pdf.
100 Democracy, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy
(last visited June 8, 2020) ("[G]overnment by the people especially: rule of the majority . . . a
government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly
or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free
elections.").
101 See e.g., Oriana Schwindt, Election Night Ratings: More than 71 Million TV Viewers
Watched Trump Win, VARIETY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://variety.com/2016/tv/news/election-night-
ratings-donald-trump-audience-1201913855/; John Koblin, Midterm Elections Deliver a Ratings
Surge, With Fox News in the Lead, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/07/business/media/midterm-election-tv-ratings.html.
102 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So
Variable When VotesAre So Predictable?, 23 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 409, 448 (1993); Shane P. Singh
& Judd R. Thornton, Elections Activate Partisanship Across Countries, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
248, 248 (2019).
103 Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, 82 UNIV. PITT. L. REV.
(2020) [hereinafter, Galperin, Death of Administrative Democracy] (asserting that the U.S.
constitutional democracy incorporates majoritarian voting in addition to individual contestation,
reason giving, and deliberation).
104 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Lillian Goldman Law Library ed., 2008)
("If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.").
105 Eg., U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIV § 1 cl. 2, XVII, XIX, XXIV.
106 Id. art. I, §§ 3, 7.
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retain or replace a representative, making it a powerful form of
accountability.17 Majoritarianism, therefore, is absolutely a central
component of democracy, but it is not where democracy begins and ends.
Indeed, while majoritarianism allows public participation in
governance, it does not give individuals significant power.108 And yet, the
Constitution demonstrates a clear priority for individual channels of
participation in governing, such as the right to petition, 109 or the right to
use the court system to seek redress for individual wrongs."'
By way of example, whether or not the majority of voters want climate
action, they have not elected a Congressional majority capable of
delivering legislation to address climate change.1" In the late 1990s, a
group of environmental organizations submitted a rulemaking petition to
the Environmental Protection Agency seeking regulatory action
notwithstanding congressional inertia. 2 Several years after the petition,
the Agency formally denied it, refusing to regulate climate pollutants.113
In response to the denial, the environmental organizations, along with a
group of state and local governments, brought their arguments to the
federal courts."4 That judicial process eventually ended with the Supreme
Court holding that the Environmental Protection Agency has the
authority to regulate climate pollution and that the Clean Air Act provides
specific procedures the Agency must follow before making a decision on
such regulation."5 This example demonstrates that even when there is no
action under majoritarian structures, there are other outlets for
meaningful individual input.
A democratic system, therefore, must also include an authentically
individual component, creating structures through which individuals can
seek change regardless of whether they are counted as part of an electoral
majonty.
107 See e.g., Bressman, infra note 155, at 462-63 (discussing the underlying assumption in
administrative law and policy that elected officials are accountable and responsive to the polity
precisely by virtue of being elected); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 185 (1997) (discussing the centrality of contestability in a republican form of
government).
108 See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (discussing partisan
gerrymandering as an effort to influence the way that votes are aggregated such that individual
votes lose power when districts are drawn to prefer a particular aggregation.)
109 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11O Id. art. III.
111 Eg., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Apparently
dissatisfied with the pace of progress on this issue in the elected branches, petitioners have come
to the courts....").
112 Id. at 510.
113 Id. at 511.
114 Id. at 514.
115 Id. at 534-35.
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Both majoritarianism and individualism make space for pre-social or
pre-political inclinations (insofar as such things exist) so that each person
can push for their own interests in governance. The final two aspects of
democracy-reason-giving and deliberation-buttress this space, while
also recognizing that interests are not, in fact, pre-social or pre-political,
but form through political and social interactions.
Reason-giving as a characteristic of democracy means imply that
those who govern must explain and justify their actions.116 These
explanations serve as the feedstock of democratic practice, providing a
basis for deciding what actions we support or oppose and also helping to
convince or persuade that an action is or is not desirable in the first
instance. Returning to the earlier example of climate rulemaking, the
Environmental Protection Agency did not simply deny the environmental
groups' petition to make a climate rule, they did so with a detailed order
that explained the reasons for their inaction.117 That reasoning was then
available to the Court, to the petitioners, and to the public as a form of
both explanation and persuasion.
The constitutional roots of reason-giving are particularly exposed in
the Due Process clauses,118 which assure, substantively, that there is a
relationship between the reasons for a law and the work that law actually
does,119 and, procedurally, that government articulates a reason prior to
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property.2
Finally, deliberation is the piece of democracy that ensures a process
for considering reasons and weighing decisions." Deliberation is the
manner in which individual and government decisionmakers take reasons
and analyze them against goals, alternatives, and motivating values.
Deliberation, in other words, is the crux of "democratic will-
formation,"12 and that will is then fed back into outlets for individual and
majoritarian participation. Revisiting, for a final time, the example of
climate change policy, deliberation is apparent in several places. First,
after it received the environmental groups' petition for rulemaking, the
Environmental Protection Agency formally sought public comment on
the matter, inviting public deliberation and material for further
administrative deliberation.123 This process facilitated the Agency's own
116 Galperin, Death ofAdministrative Democracy, supra note 103, at 52.
117 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511-14.
118 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
119 Bressman, infra note 155, at 494, 494 n. 154.
120 E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345-46 (1976) (explaining that giving reasons for
the termination of government benefits is a due process "safeguard").
121 Galperin, Death ofAdministrative Democracy, supra note 103, at 52-54.
122 RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 180.
123 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511.
1 ] 87
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
deliberation, but it also instigated a public conversation and provided a
more complete record that eventually fed into the Supreme Court's own
public-facing deliberation on the matter. In the almost fifteen years since
the Court's decision, each aspect of this process has continued to be part
of formal government and informal community discussions. 124
Deliberation thus serves as an analytical component of democracy and
as the piece of democracy that recognizes and helps to form an interactive
society rather than a collection of cloistered individuals or an aggregation
of voters.
The U.S. Constitution evinces deliberation as part of our democracy in
a variety of ways. The First Amendment's protection of speech, of course,
advances public deliberation.125 The process of bicameralism and
presentment proves that the notion of deliberation is as essential to our
government's operation as it is to public participation in democracy. As
the Supreme Court has noted, by assuring that laws are considered in both
chambers of Congress and by the President, "[t]here is an unmistakable
expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be
a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process."126
These tools, in combination, are a way for people, as voters,
individuals, and thinkers, to retain power in a vast governance system.
Through democracy people can give power to the state, and they can also
revoke it.
When applied outside of the state, democracy becomes a way to
affirmatively, articulately, and perhaps equitably distribute power.
Maybe democracy-outside-the-state is one idea too far, however. More
realistically, where there are substantial power differences in the private
sector, power differences that call for democratic engagement, then
democratically-driven state control of that power is appropriate.
With an understanding that democracy is a complex system including,
in some measure, majoritarianism, individualism, reason-giving, and
deliberation, it should be clear why politics and democracy are largely
one and the same. Politics may be informal and democracy may be
formal, but each of these pieces influences the others, meaning that to
move away from politics is to move away from democracy as well. With
this understanding, it should also be easier to ask whether the political-
democratic system is an appropriate fit for PEG.
124 E.g., Sam Evans-Brown, How Massachusetts v. EPA Forced the US. Government to Take
On Climate Change, INSIDE CLMATE NEWS, Jun. 4, 2020, https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/04062020/massachusetts-v-epa-emissions-pollution-climate-change (describing the various
ways that the Court's decision has influenced public policy in the intervening years).
125 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
126 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Deciding whether democratic governance is necessary for PEG begins
with understanding what PEG and robust democracy are. It requires
better understanding the ways that PEG is influential upon, and
tantamount, to public governance. These relationships are the subject of
the next three sections.
III. POLITICS
The extended definition and practical review of PEG, as well as the
introductory sketch of democracy, both provide a good baseline for the
argument that PEG deserves democratic attention. This section begins
this argument in earnest by showing that the wall between PEG and state
environmental governance is merely rhetorical, as PEG and state
governance co-exist in a political-economic ecosystem where each
impacts the other. Then, through an attempt to understand the political
economy of PEG,127 this section will demonstrate that PEG is political
and therefore deserves democratic attention. This part considers four
issues: first, the traditional but overdrawn distinction between public and
private and the importance of the existing distribution of power; second,
the ability of PEGto serve as a source of new ideas for public governance;
third, the ability of PEG to displace public governance; and fourth, the
role of PEG in the larger trajectory of environmental governance.
A. PEG Defies Common Notions of Public And Private
It is long past time to reject a strict public-private distinction, and PEG
helps in that endeavor. As the introduction notes, I use the terms in their
vernacular sense, where "public" signals government, and where
"private" signals operations that are certainly influenced by, but still
removed from, government. Despite the stubbornly persistent language
of "public" and "private" to indicate a meaningful, even fundamental,
barrier between the two "realms,"128 the PEG literature does not pretend
that PEG exists in a void where state authority does not. 129 PEG scholars
are plainly aware that government choices about, for instance, contract
and property law, undergird the ability of private firms to govern the
127 Political economy regards the ecosystem of government and nongovernment actions
politics and economics in the lingering lexicon of distinctions to recognize that politics and
economics are tightly and ubiquitously intertwined rather than independent spheres. Amy
Kapczynski, The Lochnerized FirstAmendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political
Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. F. 179, 181 (2018).
128 Freeman, supra note 22, at 547; Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARv. L. REV. 937, 940 (2007).
129 Eg., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 441.
1 ] 89
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
environment.130 PEG shows not only how the public transcends its
perceived domain to influence private ordering, but also how the private
too can transcend imagined boundaries and carry out the traditionally
public responsibility of governing the environment. 131
Nevertheless, as much as such a thing can exist, PEG is governance
without the state.132 In other words, it operates largely free from
affirmative government engagement. This is not to say that the state does
not engage in environmental governance, but that particular private
endeavors are formally distinct from government endeavors. PEG may
emerge to avoid state regulation,133 it may make use of state-granted rights
in contract and property,134 but it is not an affirmatively cooperative
strategy like market-mimicking policies or, for instance, affirmative and
conscious privatization of specific government functions. 135
Proponents of PEG have not advocated for it in lieu of government
action, but as a complement.136 The literature is explicit on this point,
saying unequivocally, for instance, that "the climate problem will not be
solved without government responses"137 but that PEG can "buy time
until substantial shifts occur in public support" for government action. 138
The reason PEG can happen in a political climate that does not achieve
public governance is because PEG is "not subject to the barriers that
confront government,"139 even while PEG has powers similar to those of
the state. Thus, while government may have the power to implement ideal
solutions, the argument for PEG says that it does little good to focus only
130 Eg., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 136 (recognizing
that contract law structures supply chain governance); Light & Orts, supra note 10, at 29-30
(describing property law as a "determination by the government" and a tool of PEG).
131 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 441-42.
132 Notwithstanding the constant reminder that at a minimum the state shapes the "private" law
of contract, property, and tort and more broadly shapes the entire distribution of power, particularly
economic power, that structures the so-called "private" world.
133 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I'm a Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic Critique of
Pragmatic Activism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425, 485 (2017) [hereinafter Galperin, Trust Me]
(citing Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Motivating Without Mandates? The Role of Voluntary
Programs in Environmental Governance, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 237
(Lee Paddock et al. eds., 2016)).
134 Eg., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 136 (recognizing
that contract law structures supply chain governance); Light & Orts, supra note 10, at 29-30.
135 Cf Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003)
("Private entities provide a vast array of social services for the government; administer core aspects
of government programs; and perform tasks that appear quintessentially governmental, such as
promulgating standards or regulating third-party activities.").
136 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 17.
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id. at 8.
139 Id. at 9.
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on ideal solutions that are not also viable.1" Viability is at the heart of
PEG's advancement.14 1 PEG is viable and public governance is not, the
argument goes.142 Or, at least, if one is to advance solutions it is necessary
to consider not just the ideal functionality of those solutions, but their
political odds.143 PEG is politically viable because it is not burdened with
the same political challenges as public governance.144 From this analysis
comes Vandenbergh and Gilligan's title "Beyond Politics" and the
promise that PEG can "bypass" the aversion to government action. 145 This
is the notion that animates much of the critical analysis in this Article.
Putting aside the fact that today we can clearly see a rise in political
attacks on private initiatives,146 the argument that PEG can move us
beyond politics is firmly rooted in the idea that PEG does not require new
government initiatives.147 Couched in this argument is the implication that
some constraint is lost, some flexibility gained, when we bypass
government. It is that lost constraint hat makes state action unviable and
inefficient to PEG advocates.
One thing that is not lost is power: the power to coerce and to distribute
control. Government does not have a monopoly on the power to coerce
and dominate.148 The reason that private industry is capable of such
important strides towards environmental protection is because private
industry can coerce the public relationship with and use of the
environment; it can "bind[] the entire planet into a shared and possibly
140 Id. at 13-14, 89-90.
141 Id. at 9, 13, 27, 391.
142 Id. at 89.
143 Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in
Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2014).
144 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 69-80.
145 Id. at 3-4.
146 Ross Douthat, Tucker Carlson Versus Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/12/opinion/sunday/tucker-carlson-fox-news-republicans.html;
David French, Walmart's Retreat on Guns Means Woke Capitalism Is Here to Stay, NAT'L REV.,
Sept. 4, 2019, https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/walmarts-retreat-on-guns-means-woke-
capitalism-is-here-to-stay; Megan McArdle, Opinion, Woke Capitalism Sells Out Conservatives. It
Can Sell Out Their Opponents, Too, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/woke-capitalism-fears-dont-justify-selling-conservatism-to-
trump/2019/08/27/878f90ce-c902-11e9-alfe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html. In fact, it seems that the
problem here is one of cultural self-identification rather than the role of government. Whether
government or private industry advances an initiative is irrelevant. What is relevant is the aim of
the initiative and whether the aim fits with one's cultural goals. This is probably obvious but it
could be the downfall of any governance effort hat promises consensus or facility based on an
outdated belief that it is the role of government rather than the aim of governing that creates tension.
147 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at ix.
148 Lobel, supra note 128, at 966-67.
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dismal climatic fate."149 By controlling the environment to this degree
PEG allows private firms to dictate the distribution of environmental
benefits and burdens. More on this later. 150 At this point, the importance
of recognizing the coercive power embedded in PEG is to recognize that
what is lost when we decide to move away from public governance is
emphatically not power. A move to private governance does not
automatically or necessarily protect notions of liberty, and it does not
assure non-interference or non-domination."' So what is lost that allows
PEG to move forward so easily while public governance cannot?
One thing that could be lost, but is not, according to the leading
proponents of PEG, is accountability.152 Private ordering, they say, can
help mitigate the loss of "democratic accountability" through private
mechanisms, including market incentives, peer pressure, reputational
risk, and "active participation by environmental advocacy groups .... "153
This may be right. Maybe PEG can exist without giving up the
accountability that comes with government action. But accountability
alone is far too narrow a view of politics and democracy,15 4 and it is not
the only, or even the primary, benefit of government action. Rather,
accountability is merely one fragment of public governance, one
retrospective transect of 360-degree democracy. PEG scholarship might
recognize the loss of accountability and offer a reasonable response to
that criticism,1 5 5 but in treating accountability as the main feature of
politics and democracy, it fails to see the other 359 degrees.
Consider this quote: "[a]lthough the climate problem will not be solved
without government responses .... "156 The passive voice hides a crowd
of important assumptions. Chief among these is that when government
acts or fails to act, it is we who are responsible. When we put government
in active voice it is the people who chose to act, or not act, on
environmental protection. And when we discuss the viability of one
strategy against another, we cannot judge viability as if it were a matter
of passive voice, of some exogenous and unidentified actors. Each
proposal, each debate, each action-public or private-influences the
149 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 242 (2010).
150 See infra Section VI.
151 Id.
152 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 383-86.
153 Id. at 385-86.
154 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (recognizing that accountability is a part,
but an overblown part, of democratic legitimacy).
155 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 384-86.
156 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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democratic ecosystem. To presume that private governance is not
political is to presume that private governance will not be subject to
politics, but the mounting right-wing critique of "woke capitalism"-a
broader version of private governance-plainly disproves the apolitical
premise."? Private governance seeks to avoid politics, but in so doing it
avoids democratic governance, underestimates the scope of politics, and
ignores the role of private power. This is the conceit of political economy
and it should propel us to look more closely at the way PEG and public
governance interact so that we can better understand the benefits of each.
B. A Laboratory for Governance
In 1932 Justice Brandeis famously wrote:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.158
PEG is a rich source of experimentation outside of government. It
creates strategies for addressing environmental problems designed in
hundreds or thousands of firms around the world, specific to different
industries, and possibly tailored to different environmental problems.159
Justice Brandeis is right that the power of experimentation on the small
scale can address problems and provide fodder for larger efforts. He is
also right that staying such experimentation should be done with care
because to stop experimentation is a "grave responsibility."160 This
Article asserts that people wield too little political power over PEG. This
might seem at odds with Brandeis, who clearly puts his penny down on
experimentation, but in fact, it highlights a distinction between public and
private governance.
157 Ross Douthat, Tucker Carlson Versus Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/12/opinion/sunday/tucker-carlson-fox-news-republicans.html;
David French, Walmart's Retreat on Guns Means Woke Capitalism Is Here to Stay, TiH-E NAT'L
REVIEW, Sept. 4, 2019, https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/walmarts-retreat-on-guns-
means-woke-capitalism-is-here-to-stay/; Megan McArdle, Opinion, Woke Capitalism Sells
OutCconservatives. It Can Sell Out Their Opponents, Too, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/woke-capitalism-fears-dont-justify-selling-
conservatism-to-trump/2019/08/27/878f90ce-c902-1 1e9-alfe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html.
158 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
159 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 139.
160 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311.
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A preference for experimentation is a second-order preference.
Brandeis presumed as a first-order premise that the people hold the power
to stop experimentation.161 He did not say that, because experimentation
is important, the power to stop it should be abridged. Surely Brandeis
would not have advanced such a notion as he played a central role in the
call for more democratic power against the state and industry. 162
PEG then is a valuable resource for its own climate accomplishments
and the way it can feed ideas into democratic conversations around
government action. But if PEG achieves these environmental
accomplishments without a space for complementary or countervailing
democratic power, it has traded a first-order requirement (democratic
power) for a second-order preference (experimentation).
C. Displacement
In addition to putting environmental action ahead of democratic
control, PEG has a real potential to make binding law less likely, thereby
undermining the entire endeavor. PEG may ultimately displace essential
government programs for two reasons. First, PEG might displace through
its psychological impact. Second, it might displace because it will raise
the costs of governance.
Recent studies have shown that initial engagement in pro-
environmental behaviors can have a "negative spillover" on future pro-
environmental behaviors, meaning that after undertaking a pro-
environment practice, people are less likely to undertake further practices
even when the initial behaviors have little utility and the future behaviors
have great utility. 163 This research suggests that PEG may deter more
complementary or more significant government action despite the fact
that PEG advocates concede governmental programs are also necessary.
Although there is not definitive proof that PEG will convince voters that
public law is unnecessary, the rhetoric of anti-regulatory champions
certainly reflects their belief that PEG projects, regardless of
effectiveness, should displace the need for government action.164 Senator
161 See id ("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose ... ") (emphasis added).
162 K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 11-13, 175-76 (2017).
163 Alexander Maki, et. al., Meta-analysis of pro-environmental behavior spillover, 2 NATURE
SUSTAINABILITY 307, 307 (2019); David Hagmann, Emily H. Ho, & George Lowenstein, Nudging
out support for a carbon tax, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 484, 484 (2019).
164 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, What TheyAre SayingAbout EPA 'sNew
Methane Proposal, (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/what-they-are-saying-
about-epas-new-methane-proposal (reporting the statement of Sen. Jim Inhofe asserting that
regulations are unnecessary because of voluntary industry activity) [hereinafter Inhofe Statement];
see Interview with Andrea Thomas and Aron Cramer, CLIMATE ONE (May 6, 2013),
https://www.climateone.org/audio/walmart-emit-less-live-better (touting Walmart's voluntary
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Inhofe has implied that voluntary measures make regulation unnecessary
and corporate giants like Walmart have also suggested as much. 165
This psychological displacement may be a by-product of PEG, but it
may also be intentional. Surely there are firms that undertake PEG
projects and regret any displacement those projects cause. It is hard to
prove this assertion, but the Patagonia clothing company might be an
example. Patagonia is a leader on PEG.166 The company's founder, Yvon
Chouinard, seems to be a genuinely dedicated environmentalist who has
intentionally worked environmental protection into the very heart of his
business.167 But Patagonia's story is likely so prominent because
Patagonia is an outlier.
Though there has been no empirical research on the subject, one might
assume that deeply committed environmental companies are one extreme
of the PEG spectrum. In the middle lies a large number of companies that
are ambivalent about the broader impacts of their PEG projects. This
ambivalence, though not its frequency, is evidenced by the understanding
that many firms advance PEG for the financial, not environmental,
benefits it provides. 168
On the far end of the spectrum from Patagonia lie those companies that
intentionally engage in PEG to avoid, displace, or undermine regulation.
The story of U.S. Steel in the introduction to this Article highlighted the
long, unremarked history of passive PEG, but here we are talking about
regressive, or anti-environmental private governance: private governance
aimed at avoiding or undoing environmental law. There can be no doubt
that such a thing exists.16 9 Sociologist Justin Ferrell, for example, has
conducted a quantitative text-analysis to demonstrate that corporation-
funded campaigns are designed to undermine climate change science and
efforts during a period when Walmart was also seeking to avoid the deeper, mandatory, emissions
cuts that might have come from federal law) [hereinafter Walmart Interview]; Marc Gunther, Why
Corporate America Is Reluctant o Take a Stand on Climate Action, Apr. 2, 2015, THE GUARDIAN,
htps://www.theguardian.com/sustainable -business/2015/apr/02/corporate-america-climate-
change-fight-epa (documenting Walmart (and other corporate) opposition to climate change policy)
[hereinafter Corporate Reluctance].
165 Inhofe Statement, supra note 165; Walmart Interview, supra note 165; Corporate
Reluctance, supra note 165.
166 Press Release, U.N. Environment Programme, US Outdoor Clothing Brand Patagonia Wins




167 See Nick Paumgarten, Patagonia's Philosopher-King, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2016,
htps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/19/patagonias-philosopher-king.
168 ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 96; VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 392-93.
169 Inhofe Statement, supra note 165; Walmart Interview, supra note 165; Corporate
Reluctance, supra note 165.
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foster climate change denial.1 7 Perhaps unsurprisingly, while positive
PEG may be well advertised,171 the efforts of specific firms to undermine
climate change progress are well hidden by schemes to shield donor
identities.172 Regardless of the number of firms engaged in regressive
PEG, Ferrell's research suggests that displacement of public governance,
including both existing and future law, is surely the very purpose of some
PEG endeavors.
Further, and more structurally, PEG could also raise the cost of
environmental action, thereby changing the political-economic calculus
for public governance. The model PEG project will involve changes in
firm behavior that achieve some environmental benefit. 173 For example, a
firm may reduce its energy use174 or earn a sustainability label for one of
its products. 175 Those changes will come at an initial cost, though we
should expect that they will ultimately also provide some financial
benefit. 176 Energy savings may require investment in new technology but
will ultimately reduce operating expenses. A given certification scheme
may require new monitoring and reporting costs but will allow the firm
to charge a premium for its products. The rational firm, even when
motivated first by the preferences and values of leadership rather than
market motivation, will seek to implement changes that provide the most
benefit at the least cost.177 This logic creates a PEG "dispatch order," in
which each voluntary PEG program leaves only more expensive or less
beneficial projects next-up on the menu of options.
Should the time come when the state is poised to again act on
environmental protection, prior PEG efforts-championed because they
are apolitical-would make government action less likely. Why? First,
having undertaken low-cost PEG projects and being left with only the
more expensive options, private firms will have less incentive to support
binding state action because that option will likely come at a higher
internal cost.178 Second, for state action that relies on cost-benefit analysis
170 Justin Farrell, Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization About Climate Change, 113
PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 92, 96-97 (2016).
171 Bruce Watson, The Troubling Evolution of Corporate Greenwashing, THE GUARDIAN, Aug.
20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/aug/20/greenwashing-
environmentalism-lies-companies.
172 Farrell, supra note 171, at SI Appendix 3-4.
173 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 119.
174 Id. at 120.
175 Id. at 150.
176 See generally ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 96.
177 Eg., Amartya Sen, Rational Behavior in 6 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 856-57 (2008).
178 Though it is possible that technological or financial incentive changes since the initial project
might marginally change this analysis.
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prior to promulgation, 179 costs will outweigh benefits. This is because the
costs of environmental law will be higher if the low-cost options are
already complete, and the benefits will be lower if the high-benefit
options are already complete. This calculation will imply smaller
marginal societal benefit from new law. It will have the same effect as
private firms lobbying against new regulations, though it will come not
in the form of political pressure but seemingly neutral managerial
calculations, making the anti-regulatory case in a way that seems
objective and devoid of the politics of lawmaking or prior PEG actions.
In short, PEG can lead to accidental and intentional displacement,
robustly influencing the politics of environmental protection. Despite
protests that it is "beyond politics", whether through hidden public
disinformation campaigns, ugly legislative lobbying, or tidy cost-benefit
analyses, PEG is a political heavyweight.
D. The Narrative Trajectory of Environmental Law
The weight is not merely imaginary. PEG positions itself as a new way
of looking at environmental governance, but it is also a point on a long
trajectory away from public governance. PEG, in other words, contributes
to an anti-state, maybe anti-democratic narrative proving again that it is
neither a wholly freestanding endeavor nor an apolitical one.
The narrative of environmental governance often begins with the New
Deal, in which the proactive state emerged on a large scale.180 By the
1960s and 1970s, there was skepticism growing on the left and right about
the role of government.181 On the left, that skepticism catalyzed greater
public input into a government that was seen as favoring elite interests. 182
On the right, the skepticism came to a head in the Reagan Administration,
which took a strong stand against regulation across the board.183 The anti-
regulatory sentiment of the 1980s did not bring about an immediate
retreat from environmental law, but instead gave rise to environmental
179 For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that certain administrative rulemaking under the
Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency to undertake a cost-benefit analysis
prior to agency action. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 2710-11 (2015). The requirement for
cost-benefit analysis could also be explicit in the substantive statute. Eg., Safe Drinking Water Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 1(a), 10 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i-
iii) (2018)); see Lisa H einzerling, Cost-Nothing Analysis: Environmental Economics in the Age of
Trump, 30 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REv. 287, 288 (2019).
180 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 422
n.1 (1987).
181 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1669, 1681-82 (1975).
182 Id.
183 Deregulation Then and Now, REGULATORY REv., Mar. 11, 2019, https://www.
theregreview.org/2019/03/11/deregulation-then-and-now/.
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law that promised to look less like law. The Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 are the prime example.184 The acid rain trading program offered
a market-mimicking strategy for reducing air pollution in lieu of earlier
clean air strategies that relied on mandated performance and
technology.185 Cap and trade was distinctly law, but it was less law-ish.
During the Clinton administration the trajectory moved slightly further
from traditional regulation by introducing ideas of pragmatic New
Governance that welcomed public-private collaboration.186 Examples of
this include the Negotiated Rulemaking Act187 and Project XL. The latter
was a pilot program in which the Environmental Protection Agency
agreed to relieve private industry of the burdens of regulation if the
industry could achieve the same results using its own strategies. 188 The
next step was privatization of many government functions, like site
inspections.189
The trajectory I am tracing here begins with a visible and central role
for the state, then injects more participation into state decision making to
account for private and public interests. Next, regulation becomes
"lighter" by re-creating markets. Then regulation becomes a
collaboration between government and regulated industries-the
regulation remains regulatory, but turns to private hands. Today, we are
in a state where regulation fades and private governance emerges. This
trajectory contributes, fairly or unfairly, to the skepticism of democracy
and is self-reinforcing, as it likely also results from the widespread
skepticism that has been around for years. Consider Rahman, for
example:
Despite the near-universal lip service to the idea of democratic rule of
the people in American politics, the reality is that much of contemporary
political discourse has absorbed and internalized a deep skepticism of
democracy's effectiveness and desirability ... .For some it is the market
184 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671).
185 Joshua Galperin, Thirty Years of Third-Stage Environmentalism, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov.
28, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/thirty-years-of-third-stage-environmentalism_b_
583c7fc5e4b037ba5d6ae4ad.
186 Eg., President William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Initiative to Streamline
Government (Mar. 3, 1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/speeches/
030393.html ("The Federal Government simply can't do everything and there are many things the
States or the private sector could do better.").
187 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570).
188 Project XL, U.S. EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/projectxl/web/html/index.html.
189 Robert L. Glicksman & David L. Markell, Unravelling the Administrative State: Mechanism
Choice, Key Actors, and Regulatory Tools, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 318, 368 (2018).
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that appears more likely to produce socially desirable outcomes and be
robust to capture. 190
These words plainly show that PEG has become important because of
the skepticism, and also bolsters the skepticism, of democracy.
Though we can assert and sincerely believe that PEG is not a
replacement for public governance but merely a buttress or temporary
fallback,191 that is not the political narrative into which it falls. Whatever
role we want PEG to play, its political place is not something any
individual chooses. This is partly why the democratic practice described
in the third section of this Article is so important. A structure for
collective choosing allows us to be explicit about the trade-off between
private volunteerism and public direction, and even provides some level
of control over the way we use information. Whether or not we have the
right structure, we are still engaged in politics, so the goal is to make
politics work.
The goal of this section was to demonstrate that PEG is not free from
politics, the politics of state action is not free from PEG, and therefore
democracy is necessary for PEG. The following section continues down
this path, arguing that not only is PEG political, but it involves many
complex choices demanding democratic consideration.
IV. CHOICES
PEG recommends a path "beyond politics" but that path is not viable
because politics is not merely an obstacle-politics is all there is. Any
path will lead us directly into the mouth of politics. In the words of
Professor Kysar, "[r]esponsibility is unavoidable"192 and all our choices
have moral content; none bypass the complexity of collective reality. The
choice to rely or not rely on private governance is a political choice. It is
just a choice to use or not use the democratic processes of the state.
From the state perspective, inaction is a political choice because "[a]
policy of nonintervention is as political as any other." 193 From a more
universal vantage, it is a collective choice to attack problems through the
state or through non-state actors. A collective decision to pursue PEG
rather than state governance is a political decision even if it is not a
government decision and even if it is not an affirmative decision. Of
course, one response to this line of thinking is that wherever government
is in a position to supplant PEG but does not, that is a democratic action.
190 RAHMAN, supra note 163, at 4.
191 VANDENBERGH AND GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 383.
192 KYSAR, supra note 149, at 16.
193 MCCONNELL, supra note 31, at 247.
1 ] 99
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
Inaction is also an option for the institutions of government. Narrowly,
this is probably true: the availability of state-sponsored democratic
practice means that failure of the state to act is a species of collective
choice. The problem, however, is that PEG asks us to sidestep state
institutions for democratic decision making. Government inaction with
regard to PEG, then, is not always the result of democracy-it may be the
result of inattention to democracy.
In this section, I do not argue that turning to PEG is a bad choice. I
argue instead that we must recognize the necessity of making political
choices because there is no neutral and irreducible principle that can
autonomously answer for us. Because we must choose, we must have a
forum for collective choice. That forum is democracy. Because PEG does
not let us escape political choices, we have yet another trigger for
democratic assessment of PEG.
To build the case that environmental policy forces us to make
collective choices best addressed with democratic institutions, I consider
and reject three "rules" on which some might wish to rely as natural
mandates for environmental policy that would allow us to escape political
choices and joint responsibility. There is not a rule of distinction between
public and private action, not a rule of natural balance, and not a rule of
quantifiable aggregate welfare. These false rules incorrectly merge "is"
and "ought," supposing that what we think we know about the natural
order of the world tells us what the law must be. 194 They are just samples
of the sort of foundationalist objectification that tries, but fails, to
constrain discretion, truncate choice, and make the effort and
responsibility of democracy unnecessary.
A. Revisiting the Public-Private Distinction
The first place we might wish to find easy answers could be the
seemingly natural ordering of the market. For generations, many have
operated under a belief that there are two distinct spheres of human
operation, the public sphere and the private sphere.195 If this premise were
true, then we could practice politics with an easy rule: the public should
not interfere with the private but for exceptional circumstances. Those
194 RAYMOND WACKS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13 (2d ed. 2014).
195 David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2015); Freeman, supra note 22, at 588; William W. Buzbee, Accountability
Conceptions and Federalism Tales: Disney's Wonderful World?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1290, 1302
(2002);
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS ix (1977); ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW vii (1952); see KYSAR, supra
note 149, at 51.
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circumstances might include market failure where private-private
interactions produce negative externalities that only the public sphere
could remedy through coercion.196
As it is at the heart of an argument for democratic control of PEG, I
again reiterate that the problem with using the public-private distinction
is that the distinction is much less defined than popular accounts suggest.
Private markets are not free of government. 197 Government is not even
free of private markets.198 Government establishes, develops, and
enforces the currency of private markets: the law of property, contract,
and tort.199 Government also shapes corporate behavior,20 and consumer
preferences.201 "[M]arket demands themselves do not spontaneously
spring up, they have to be nurtured by government,"202 nurtured by public
road building, corporate chartering, limits on or permission for
unionization, allowance of some monopolies, protections of speech, state
law preemption, and so many other areas where public choices and laws
weigh on "private" inclinations.203 Without this basic level of coexistence
private markets could not function. At a more complex level government
raises taxes, offers subsidies and tax incentives, and in many other ways
distributes the resources that allow meaningful participation in markets.
Neither at the fundamental level nor at the level of contemporary practice
are the public and the private distinct in ways that lets us chart a neutral
or consistent path. Instead, we have to choose our direction and then
chose it again at each intersection.
B. Nature Is No Guide
The second place we search, in vain, for easy answers is the ordering
of nature. The ideal of this fixed end is to reduce our political debate to
ecological principles, with the grandest and most hallowed guide among
those principles being the "balance of nature." "At one time, a comforting
balance-of-nature paradigm promised continued, steady ecological
196 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 196, at 6.
197 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 196 at 15-16; Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as
Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019).
198 Freeman, supra note 22, at 547; see generally Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private
Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REv. 467 (2020) (describing various forms of hybrid public-
private governance, focusing primarily on law that requires private firms to act as enforcement
authorities with respect to other private actors with which they do business).
199 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 196, at 16.
200 E.g., Light, supra note 198, at 140 (explaining that government shapes environmental law
not only through environmental laws, but through corporate law, securities regulation, antitrust,
and bankruptcy.)
201 See LINDBLOM, supra note 195, at 173.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 174.
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services." 204 The vision of a steady environmental system led
environmental thinkers to propose an environmental politics with the
prime directive of non-interference or, if interference was unavoidable or
inadvertent, restoration of the natural balance.205 But there is no balance
of nature, there never was.206 Nature is in constant flux, dynamism the
watchword, not stability, which is how we explain emergent processes as
magnificent as evolution.20 7 The idea of balance, if it ever were real, is
certainly put to rest when we consider the modern concept of the
Anthropocene, in which human activity impacts, or is integrated with,
literally every aspect of the natural world.20 There is no nature distinct
from humanity and no external balance that humanity can pursue.
Just as the discrete line between public and private was a fiction that
could guide but not dictate political goals, we might choose to try to
create a balance of nature. That is a perfectly proper normative goal, but
it should not claim positive natural origins. Some critics point to the
foundational environmental laws of the 1970s and complain that those
laws are solidly pointed towards restoring a balance with which humans
had long interfered.20 9 That could be an indictment of the laws, but it
could also be evidence of a political choice based not on what nature
commanded, but what people chose. In this latter view, the idea of
balanced nature does not command fidelity. But maybe a collective will
has shaped a myth of balanced nature that reflects our preferences rather
than our predestination, because the reality of nature is not necessarily
what people want.210 Regardless, the point is to forget nature as a ukase
that demands any possible path to environmental progress and to
reconceive nature as a source of innovation and contestation.21
204 Robert L. Fischman, Letting Go of Stability: Resilience and Environmental Law, 94 IND. L.J.
689, 690 (2019).
205 Id.
206 See generally OSWALD J. SCHMITZ: THE NEW ECOLOGY: RETHINKING A SCIENCE FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE (2017) (explaining the long fascination with balance of nature in environmental
science); PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra note 22 (tracing the history of environmental thought and
how fixed views of nature are disrupted in a world where humans exert such obvious control over
all of Earth's systems.)
207 Eg., CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859) (introducing the idea that
through constant change at the organismal level, entirely new species emerge).
208 See generally, PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra note 22.
209 Fischman, supra note 205, at 708.
210 Id. (explaining that the reality of nature is unpredictable but that people strive for law that
creates predictability).
211 See PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra note 22, at 194.
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C. Math Is No Substitute
The third, and final, place to fruitlessly toil for easy answers is welfare
economics. Welfare economics is in some ways the embodiment of a
classical but also radically liberal ideal that individualism is all there is."
The insistence on thinking only of the individual and no emergent society,
culture, or polity allows the welfare economist to identify public goals by
aggregating individual preferences and using the aggregate to produce
state policy. 213 In other words, the state can quantify the internal
preferences of individuals, calculate an optimum policy and optimum
tools for pursuing that policy, thereby withdrawing from any fraught
public deliberation and erasing the need to make difficult choices.
The problems of this easy answer come in a practical and theoretical
register. The practical problems are extensive, and include the
impossibility of actually quantifying individual preferences, comparing
those vastly different preferences, and ultimately, figuring out how to do
the math.2" The theoretical problem, more important for the purposes of
this analysis, is that welfare maximization begins and ends with
individual preference rankings and quantification. By zeroing in on the
individual as the source of value it becomes impossible to account for
political others: we cannot account for the desires of people outside of
our political jurisdiction, for future generations, or for nonhuman life."'
The rhetorical simplicity of knowing what we must do by measuring what
we want covers up the yawning void implicit in "we," because the
individuals measured cannot include all the individuals who may be
subject to law.
The other theoretical problem is even more tethered to the need for
robust democratic awareness at the heart of this Article. Welfare
maximization assumes that we can measure individual wants and then
calculate collective goals. But this assumption ignores that the process of
calculating, deliberating, and reasoning shapes values and preferences.216
Neither exists ignorant and independent of the other.217 In short:
[The] calculus of choice is premised on the notion that public
policy should impartially and objectively reflect the determinants
212 See KYSAR, supra note 149, at 15 (describing welfare economics and welfare maximization
as rooted in individualism).
213 Id. at 15, 71.
214 See generally, FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2002) (detailing the functional problems of
cost benefit analysis).
215 KYSAR, supra note 149, at 18.
216 Id. at 15.
217 Id.
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of individual well-being, paying no heed whatsoever to goals or
interests that are articulated at the collective level. The approach
seeks precisely to eliminate collective discretion and judgement
by formalizing and determining-empirically-the content of
public policy according to individual welfare consequences.218
Welfare economics produces something real, something that might be
a useful guide, but that has no claim to objective reality or fundamental
certainty. Like the public-private distinction or the balance of nature, it is
just a guide or a helpful myth, and it does not relieve us of the hard work
of choosing our futures.
D. What Should We Do?
The specific point here is that the first principles of some
environmental thinking get us no further than first base. The general point
is that objectivist governance, public or private, is not realistic. This is
not to say that real knowledge, even certainty, about the world is
impossible, just that where there is certainty it can provide us only the
"is" and not the "ought."2 19 If our knowledge about the world gave us an
ought we would only need to ask "what shall we do?" as in, what is
necessary to get to a predetermined goal?220 What is necessary to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 5 billion tons annually? Choosing tools is a
relatively easy endeavor.22 1 Instead, we are asking "what should we do?"
as in, what ought we aim for, what do we prefer, what do we want?22
The core assurance of each of the three arguments I have considered
in this section is that they can provide us with an unassailable definition
of a public good and from there we need only develop effective
instruments to work towards that good. This makes democratic efforts
much simpler, if not totally unnecessary. With this framing we can
identify three ways to define a public good, three ways that the
foundationalist principles we have rejected might have informed a fixed
common goal. The objectivist definition of a public good holds that the
public good is a "determinant object" on which we must agree.22 3
Identifying a balance of nature that is quantifiable and meaningful would
have fit within this definition. The welfarist meaning of public good takes
on a part of what we are aiming for in this section, admitting that the
218 Id. (emphasis removed).
219 See James L. Huffman, Protecting the Environment from Orthodox Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 349, 354-57 (1991).
220 RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 136.
221 MCCONNELL, supra note 31, at 46.
222 RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 136.
223 Id. at 38.
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public good is indeed a subjective idea, yet while the welfarist public
good has no "settled content . .. it does have settled form:" the
aggregation of individual preferences."4 This looks something like the
public good we might be forced to accept if we relied on only quantifiable
human preferences to answer our biggest collective questions. To Henry
Richardson, there is a third option, the "liberal public good," which is an
identifiable goal, but unlike the objectivist and welfarist definitions, the
liberal good is never fixed. The liberal public good is not independent of
the actual content of the public.125 Thus, where the objectivist good is a
fixed object and the welfarist good is a calculated subject, both emerge
from some source other than a self-aware, reasoning public.226 The liberal
public good results from collective deliberation and shifts with that
deliberation-the deliberation is an ingredient in the good, or a step in
the recipe. While Richardson calls this the Liberal Public Good, I might
call it the Democratic Public Good to distinguish it from the classical and
neoliberal foundations of welfarist versions. Regardless, the point is
clear: public decision making is not a purely or even primarily objective
or scientific project with certain answers. It is a project of attentive
interaction.
When called "scientific governance," the idea of totally objective
policymaking is attributed to early 2 0th Century Progressives." In that
context, Progressives believed that by isolating a reducible public interest
or public good they could then apolitically work towards that goal.22 We
should reject the pursuit of objectifying societal ends whether under the
Progressive, neoliberal, or ecological flag. But we should not turn away
from the Progressives just yet, because the scientific governance, the easy
answers and neutral principles they might have applied, was hardly based
on a Progressive consensus. The purpose of Progressive scientific
governance was to limit discretion-that is, to limit choice-because the
Progressives saw private power as too dominant and therefore saw
government decisions as the choices only of the powerful.2 29
Recent scholarship is highlighting another aspect of Progressive
thought, also sparked by a desire to recognize and tamp down unequal
power. This scholarship rejects the Progressive idea that we can control




227 MCCONNELL, supra note 31, at 43, 281.
228 Id. at 43.
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to articulately and intentionally redistribute power.2 3' Dewey, the
pragmatic critic of foundationalism and champion of social deliberation
was one of the leading Progressives to avoid objectification as a means
of tidying-up social decision making.2 3 1 "It is democracy, according to
John Dewey, that is the cauldron in which goals and values are conjured,
established, communicated, tested, and ultimately implemented."2 32
When we reject foundationalist neutrality as a path certain to lead us to
the objectively right social choice, we are left with the impossible but
indispensable task of choosing. "For understanding political choices,"
wrote Charles Lindblom (an economist and management scholar, not a
Progressive idealist), "we need a concept that will identify not a datum,
but an emergent act of will." 233 That concept is democracy. And
democracy was also Dewey's model for collective choosing. Because
environmental protection leaves us with so many choices, and because
PEG, as a political endeavor, does not let us escape those choices, it is
necessary and appropriate to question whether PEG is sufficiently
democratic. This section and the prior thus offer triggers for democracy
politics and choice-and urge that in neither case should PEG escape
democratic treatment. The following section adds a third and final call for
democracy, making the case that PEG, even as a nominally private
endeavor, can infringe liberty, and the infringement of liberty is also an
appropriate trigger for democratic practice.
V. LIBERTY & POWER
Liberty and democracy are not the same thing. Liberty "is principally
concerned with the area of control, not with its source. "234 Democracy is
a potential source of control, a form of self-governance that may or may
not protect liberty.2 3' But, where liberty is at stake, democratic
governance can serve as a collective tool to either agree that a limitation
on liberty is appropriate or to use the power of a democratic state to stop
the infringement. Infringement on liberty is a risk when there is a greatly
unequal distribution of power.
In democracies, people have inherent tools to exercise power against,
or retract power from, the state. Whether the same is true in PEG is an
open question. This section argues that in addition to being a matter of
230 E.g., RAHMAN, supra note 163, at 33; BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC'S LAW: ORIGINS AND
ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 28 (2019).
231 Galperin, Trust Me, supra note 133, at 436, 438-39; EMERSON, supra note 231, at 93-94.
232 Galperin, Trust Me, supra note 133, at 438-39 (citing DEWEY, supra note 17).
233 LINDBLOM, supra note 195, at 135.
234 ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 176 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
235 Id.
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collective political choices, PEG is also a matter of liberty and power,
and, as such, democratic consideration is necessary. In broad terms, the
choices that trigger democracy are social choices, exercises of power over
society, that impact liberty.2 36
A. Defining Liberty
There are two key competing definitions of liberty today, but each of
them can recognize PEG as a potential limitation on liberty. And each of
today's dominant views is best understood in light of an earlier view.
Writing of this earlier conception of liberty, Hobbes explained that liberty
exists where external forces do not prevent people from acting as they
have chosen to act.237 If a person in debt has chosen to pay the debt for
fear of going to prison, Hobbes explained, that person still has liberty. 238
Default may have grave consequences and may effectively eliminate the
choice not to pay, but the fact that a choice is shaped by those
consequences is irrelevant to Hobbes' vision.2 39  Regardless of
circumstances, there is liberty in this view so long as the person chooses
to pay the debt and there is no frustration in that choice.240
In a line of argument that has since overtaken the Hobbesian view,
Isaiah Berlin explained that the older vision of liberty was too narrow.2 1
Illustrating the distinction between Hobbes and Berlin, Philip Pettit uses
the metaphor of liberty as a set of doors.242 Hobbesian liberty means that
if a person choses to walk through door A, because she knows door A is
unlocked and the other doors are locked, then there is complete liberty
despite the fact that the locked doors shaped the choice to go through door
A.243 In Berlin's view, more is necessary than just the ability to do what
you end up choosing to do, because that choice may be entirely
predetermined by circumstances, such as knowing that all the other doors
are locked.2"4 Berlinian liberty, then, is a liberty of non-interference, and
demands that there is freedom to go through any of the doors.2 5 It is not
enough that the door chosen happens to be open because, by locking a
236 See, PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 183-87
(1997) (explaining that contestability, as a central feature of democracy, arises to protect liberty as
defined as non-domination) [hereinafter REPUBLICANISM].




241 Philip Pettit, The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case ofIsaiah Berlin, 121
ETHICS 693, 698 (2011) [hereinafter, Pettit, The Instability of Freedom].
242 Id. at 698, 704.
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single door, there has been an interference with free choice and thus with
liberty.246
Berlin's definition of liberty fits within the assertion that each of us
achieves individual freedom-liberty-when there is an "absence of
interference."4 7 Interference includes being subject to orders and
sanctions.248 Thus, when the state tells you that you must drive at a certain
speed or install pollution control devices, that is interference with
otherwise uninhibited choice. In this non-interference view "there is
nothing inherently oppressive about some people having dominating
power over others ... ."249
Non-domination is a modern and alternative view of liberty, for which
Philip Pettit is a leading advocate. Pettit argues that interference is not the
primary concern of freedom; instead, it is that circumstances leave some
vulnerable to the will of others.250 One is dominated when subject to the
uncontrolled wishes of another.251 In the non-domination conception of
liberty the concern is not only actual interference, but the ability to
interfere, whether or not interference happens.25 2 In that respect, if the
state has the right to inspect a facility at any time, it dominates the facility
operator by holding the ability to enter the property, interfering with their
right to exclude even if the government does not exercise its right to
inspect.2s3
The door metaphor that Pettit used to explain Hobbesian and Berlinian
liberty also helps illustrate Pettit's preferred non-denomination
description of liberty. In the Hobbesian view, a person has liberty if they
chose a door that is unlocked, even if they select that door because they
know that it is the only option available.25 4 In the Berlinian view, a person
has liberty if all the doors are unlocked.255 In Pettit's view, the doors must
all be unlocked and there must not be a doorkeeper with the ability to
keep you away.256 The fact of the doorkeeper's presence, of the
246 Id.
247 PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 237, at 9; Liberalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Online Edition 2019) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism.
248 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT) 44-45 (2017).
249 PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 237, at 9.
250 Id. at 5; EMERSON, supra note 231, at 89-90, 159.
251 PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 237, at 5.
252 Id.
253 Id. (describing domination as the ability to interfere not necessarily active interference).
254 Pettit, The Instability of Freedom, supra note 242, at 698, 704.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 704.
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doorkeeper's ability to stop free choice, is a domination, whether or not
the doorkeeper actually blocks a door.257
B. Public and Private Burdens on Liberty
The definitions of both interference and domination highlight that
restrictions on liberty, however conceived, can come from private
(insofar as it is non-state) power.258 The state may dominate by having the
power to enter property, and it may interfere by mandating certain
behaviors. "The particular coercive power of the state-to impose
financial penalties, withhold benefits, condemn our property, throw us in
jail-is undeniable, "259 but it does not follow that private coercive power
does not exist. There has long been a presumption that deference to the
private sphere will "eliminate the phenomenon of power," whether that
power is domination or interference, but "powers exist in the hands of
[private] groups ... powers over matters affecting the larger
community."260
One might argue that something akin to private interference and
domination is real but, unlike government control, they are always
essentially voluntary and therefore not properly regarded as infringement
on individual liberty.261 At best this is only formally true. In practice, the
demands of an uneven economy do not allow most people to escape the
dominance or interference of their employer by quitting or forgoing a job,
even if the employer limits the employee's liberty based formally on a
voluntary employment contract.262 If one cannot afford to go without
work, one is not engaged in a fully voluntary agreement.263
Our choices in the private sphere are voluntary in a thin sense. They
are limited by our capacities and they are always shaped by social norms.
So private choices are not only not fully voluntary, they are never purely
individual.264 Choices are also shaped by relative needs, that is, relative
to others in society. "[M]any individuals in the market do not determine
their own purposive activity. Instead their agency is shaped by
exogenous, unknown, and often averse circumstances,"265 making the
formally voluntary nature of those choices an excuse to ignore them
257 Id. at 705, 709.
258 EMERSON, supra note 231, at 159-60; RAHMAN, supra note 163, at 13, 56.
259 Freeman, supra note 22, at 551.
260 MCCONNELL, supra note 31, at 5.
261 See ANDERSON, supra note 249, at 52-53 (citing Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937)); RAHMAN, supra note 163, at 13.
262 ANDERSON, supra note 249, at 53-54.
263 Id. at 52-56.
264 EMERSON, supra note 231, at 160.
265 Id. at 161.
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rather than a reflection of a reality in which "a confluence of human-made
rules . . . constrains the prospects for individual well-being. "266
C. PEG As Interference and Domination
In the environmental context, the formalist contrivance of free and
equal bargaining is a non-starter. There is no purported negotiation and
contracting over the global climate, sea level rise, waste, etc. Private
actors have largely unfettered control over many environmental
resources, not least of which is the global climate.267 When private firms
make private decisions about how to treat this type of global resource,
they can dominate, by holding the power to control the global climate, to
force changes in lifestyle and consumption. Private actors can dominate
by holding the power to, for instance, determine which consumers will be
able to buy products and services to help adapt to climate change. Private
firms can even determine whether those products and services are
available at all. They can dominate to the extent we need their good
graces to maintain water or food supplies or power our homes with
renewable energy. Private actors can also interfere, for example, by
contributing to rising seas that may make our homes uninhabitable,
interfering with our choice of where to live, how to adapt, where to seek
safety and comfort. Outside of the environmental context private actors
may interfere by mandating exactly what we do at work and limiting our
hobbies outside of work,26 ' but with respect to climate change, they can
interfere by contributing to the warming and drought that take away our
choice to live on today's coast or in arid climates, our choice to work in
or enjoy certain industries like winter recreation, or even drink tap water,
go outside when we want, or grow and eat the food we prefer.
I doubt there can be much skepticism about the ability of private firms
to interfere with and dominate our interactions with the natural world.
Nevertheless, some concrete examples may help put a finer point on the
issue. In the United States roughly half the population, over 160 million
266 RAHMAN, supra note 163, at 13.
267 See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 5 (explaining that private firms could
help reduce climate changing emissions by 3 billion tons and thereby implying that private firms
alone have substantial control over the global average temperature and the future of climate
stability). I have a memory of attending a talk at which Professor Vandenbergh recounted when
Willie Sutton was asked why he robbed banks. "Because that's where the money is," Sutton replied.
In my memory, Mike said something like the following: Private firms are Sutton's banks. We need
to approach private firms because that is where the pollution is. Unable to find a reference to or
transcription of this talk, I asked Mike if he remembered it. He said he could imagine himself saying
that, but he didn't think he had. Since Mike isn't willing to take credit for the Sutton reference, I
will take the credit. Why is PEG important? Because that is where the power is.
268 ANDERSON, supra note 249, at 49-50.
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people, live on the coasts, supporting 66 million jobs and producing well
over half the country's GDP.269 Climate change, however, poses a serious
threat to the coasts.27 Faced with the threats of climate change, coastal
residents and businesses have a number of choices. People on the coast
may choose to do nothing. Much like the result of not paying Hobbes'
debt, doing nothing is one option, but the threat of complete destruction
from storm surges or rising seas violently interferes with that choice.271
Private firms, with control over at least 3 billion tons of greenhouse gas
emissions annually,72 are the actors who dominate by making that choice
realistically impossible and arguably interfere by taking away the genuine
choice to stay.
Climate change's threat to coastal communities is hardly constrained
to limiting the choices of vacation beach communities. Indigenous people
along coasts, including in the United States, are doing the astounding
work of adapting their lives to a changing climate. The Alaska Native
Village of Kivalina has been preparing for decades to address the rising
seas that result from private emissions of greenhouse gases.273 The people
of Kivalina have a variety of choices, but their choices are both obviously
and subtly structured by the imperious power of the private firms that
contribute to the rising seas, offer promises of improvement through
green products that are not available in the most remote regions of Alaska,
and produce the material that has so far failed to protect the community
from coastal erosion.274 As a result, the Native Village of Kivalina is hard
at work relocating. Relocating homes, finding ways to retreat during the
worst storms, rebuilding their school on higher ground, and seeking
locations for a new permanent village.27 These are emotional and
staggeringly complex efforts that are heavily weighted by the relationship
between the people of Kivalina and those who have the power to mitigate
climate change and provide adaptation tools.
If climate change is too abstract, there are more concrete examples.
The Marine Stewardship Council certifies sustainable fisheries and major
retailers like Walmart only source MSC-certified seafood.276 But seafood
269 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Home's Compensation Analysis
with an Eye to Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, 35 STAN. ENv. L.J. 3,4-5 (2016).
270 Id. at 5.
271 See, e.g., id. at 27 (describing the devastation of coastal storms).
272 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 5.
273 Relocating Kivalina, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT, https://toolkit.climate.gov/case-
studies/relocating-kivalina (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
274 Id. (identifying a variety of projects, including public-private partnerships all of which rely
on some degree of private engagement through raw material, labor, or investment).
275 Id.
276 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 150.
1 ] 111
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
bearing the MSC logo sells at a premium.277 MSC and retailers like
Walmart dominate those consumers because economic institutions are set
up in such a way that the average consumer has little power to address
sustainable seafood without MSC and Walmart's permission; they must
spend more money and accept the MSC label. We can see the same
domination on the other side of the supply chain. The owner of a small
fishing fleet may bristle at the MSC program because it is not sustainable
enough,278 or because it is too expensive to participate,279 or because she
simply does not care about sustainability. But the economic system is
such that the owner of this small fleet may need permission from the
world's largest retailers before she can sell her catch and many will not
grant that permission if she does not attain MSC certification.20
To bring the examples closer to home, PEG may also interfere with
and dominate those who wish to access open spaces or have encounters
with animals in nature. The male Attwater's Prairie Chicken performs a
stunning courtship dance that has long caught the eye of both females of
the species and conservationists.21 But the species is critically
endangered today.282 If we want to visit the species, we need permission
from private landowners like the Nature Conservancy.28 3 The power to
exclude from nature is the power to dominate. Moreover, the Nature
Conservancy not only has the power to welcome or exclude, it also has
the power to maintain or further endanger the Attwater's Prairie
Chicken,24 giving this large organization the power to interfere with the
ability to ever again see this bird in nature.
This private power to dominate and interfere demonstrates how liberty
is at stake in PEG, but it can also demonstrate that constraints on liberty
often fall unevenly, making some form of accessible and equitable
democratic control even more important. Pollution trading programs have
277 Daniel Zwerdling & Margot Williams, Is Sustainable-Labeled Seafood Really Sustainable?,
NAT. PUB. RADIO, Feb. 11, 2013, https://www.npr.org/2013/02/11/171376509/is-sustainable-
labeled-seafood-really-sustainable.
278 Eg., Frank Wijen & Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Controversy Over Voluntary
Environmental Standards: A Socioeconomic Analysis of the Marine Stewardship Council, 32 ORG.
& ENVTL. 98, 104-05 (2019).
279 Id. at 102.
280 See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 150 (noting that
Walmart and McDonald's sell only MSC certified seafood).
281 FRIENDS OF THE ATWATER PRAIRIE CHICKEN REFUGE, https://attwater.org/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2021).
282 Id.
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been a popular tool for environmental protection since they first appeared
at scale in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.25 Policymakers design
trading schemes to reduce overall pollution, but those reductions have
unequal benefits because polluters can "pick and choose where actual
cuts happen."2 6 As it happens, these choices lead to a huge
disproportionate impact on Black people, who are exposed to 56% more
pollution than average consumption habits would generate.27 To be fair,
cap-and-trade programs like this are often public policy, not PEG.288 But
private firms have also adopted voluntary trading regimes where there is
even less oversight of the discriminatory impacts.2 9 Major energy
companies like Shell and British Petroleum have established intra-firm
trading programs between different units of the business.290 Shell has
major facilities in the U.S. in communities with different racial make-
ups.291 The ability to increase pollution at one facility and decrease at
another will have a positive effect on pollution globally, but could
severely burden a given community. This is a burden on liberty with
respect to the very ability to live a long and healthy life, to say nothing of
the ability to simply spend time outdoors. This disproportionate burden
on the liberty of people of color makes it even more important to aim for
a meaningful, inclusive, and participatory democracy.
The point of both the political philosophy and practical examples is
simple: the key to understanding when democracy is necessary does not
depend on the distinction between public and private action. The key is
liberty, which is susceptible to domination and interference by both
private and public actors. Economically, these forms of private
domination and interference are called externalities, an orderly name that
suggests they are just slight predicaments at the edges of liberalism. In
285 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671); see also, Joshua Galperin, Thirty Years of Third-Stage
Environmentalism, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 28, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/thirty-
years-of-third-stage-environmentalism_b_583c7fc5e4b037ba5d6ae4ad.
286 Liam Denning, Fighting Climate Change Means Fighting Racial Injustice, BLOOMBERG,





288 E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671).
289 Light & Orts, supra note 10, at 38-39.
290 Id. at 39.
291 See Projects and Locations, SHELL U.S., https://www.shell.us/about-us/projects-and-
locations.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
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fact, they are forms of interference and domination core to thinking about
liberty.292
If private firms did not have the power to decide matters affecting the
larger community, even the entire globe, then PEG would be no special
thing. Only because private actors can govern the environment, because
private actors have such great power in this realm, does PEG become a
topic worthy of consideration.
Where there is power to cabin liberty, or, as Professor Emerson says,
when there is power to prevent people from "determining our own
commitments and plans,"293 whether through interference or domination,
there should be a way to counterbalance or legitimate that power.294 In
Professor Richardson's words, "[w]e are dominated to the extent that we
are subject to the arbitrary power of others . . . .Power is arbitrary when
it is not adequately controlled by a fair process of decision .... "295
Democracy is the fair process. It is a system for assuring, whether in the
non-interference or non-domination frame, that when liberty is invaded
there is a voice for the subjects of the invasion.296
CONCLUSION
This Article asserts that private environmental governance, despite
being a nominally private endeavor, should be subject to democracy.
When I say that democracy is necessary to control PEG, I mean two
things. First, when firms engage in PEG, they should consider structuring
their commitments in a way that invites the majoritarian, individual,
reason-giving, and deliberative forms of participation necessary for a
robust democracy. This is important, though it is probably unrealistic
insofar as it asks too much of PEG leaders. It is also not enough on its
own. Thus, the second thing I mean when I say that PEG needs
democracy is that public, state-driven governance is also essential to
controlling excessive power imbalances and environmental domination.
We all have to "do" democracy better in order to take advantage of the
control that democracy should provide. That is, we should use the state
to shape PEG as we want to see it.
This might seem a futile call to some readers. In recent years
commentators have forcefully argued that the government is failing at
292 See EMERSON, supra note 231 at 89-90, 151.
293 Id. at 150.
294 E.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 27 (explaining that when freedom is limited there must
be legitimation of the limitation).
295 Id. at 250.
296 Id. at 187.
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many critical tasks, of which environmental protection is just one.297 This
is true but it is not inescapable. Whether public governance succeeds or
fails is something we can control. Moreover, a government that succeeds
is not such an unrealistic ideal that it is not worth pursuing. It was only
30 years ago that the U.S. last enacted a major environmental law.29
Other foundational environmental laws were born only 20 years before
that.299 Just prior, the United States sent people to the moon,300 and just
before that the Civil Rights Act became law.301  The New Deal, a
generation earlier, with all its flaws and injustice, is at least evidence of a
government that can be wildly productive.302 At the turn of the 2 0th
century the Pure Food and Drug Act saved countless lives.30 3 The list, of
course, continues. There is no point in imagining, arguing, or despairing
that the collective public enterprise is hopeless. The evidence to the
contrary is too great.
Despite hints in that direction, the leading scholars and advocates of
PEG are clear that they do not think PEG is a substitute for public
governance.304 This Article should enrich a dialogue to more clearly
articulate why PEG is no substitute. One might argue that PEG is no
substitute because the private sector alone cannot achieve enough
environmental progress without government mandates, that even with
PEG, government is necessary to reach quantitative conservation goals.
That is an instrumental argument, and a convincing one. It is an argument
at which other PEG scholars have nodded.305 Thus, the PEG literature has
297 E g., Dana Milbank, The US. Government is Failing Catastrophically at its Most Basic
Function, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/03/16/this-crisis-looks-worse-than-911-2008-collapse-will-we-finally-fix-our-politics/;
James Speth, Environmental Failure: A Case for a New Green Politics, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360,
Oct. 20, 2008, https://e360.yale.edu/features/environmental_failure_a_case_for_a_newgreen
politics.
298 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671).
299 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 et. seq.); Clean Air Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-
7671); Clean Water Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq.);
Endangered Species Act of Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. 1531 et. seq.).
300 July 20, 1969: One Giant Leap For Mankind, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/
apollo/apollo11.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
301 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.).
302 Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV.
515, 517 (2003).
303 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
304 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 17.
305 See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (explaining that PEG can achieve a roughly 3-billion-ton reduction in
greenhouse case but that a 5-billion ton reduction will be necessary to stay below 2.5 degrees
Celsius of global warming, so that government action may also be needed).
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already taken the first step in opening a dialogue about he relative value
of public and private efforts. This Article seeks to enrich that dialogue by
taking a second step, arguing that in addition to the instrumental
differences, PEG may not be a substitute for public governance because
PEG may not provide sufficient democratic opportunity. This Article
focuses on the different democratic qualities of public and private
governance, not merely their different quantitative capacities for reaching
numeric goals. It makes the assertion that merely because environmental
governance is "private" does not, and should not, free it from democratic
consideration. The next step in this conversation, which I will take in a
future article,306 begins with the premise that PEG needs democracy and
asks whether PEG does, in fact, provide for democratic practice. Finding
that it does not, I will offer constructive ideas for closing the gap.
I hope that here, roughly 20,000 words later, the fact that PEG needs
democratic reflection seems obvious, but I recognize that there is a heavy
burden when suggesting that something currently left to individual whim
should instead be subject to some form of equitable collective
deliberation.
Many-arguably all-non-governmental behaviors have real impacts
on the wider world. The temperature at which I keep my hot water
heater,307 whether I use chemicals on my lawn,308 the type of lightbulbs I
use,309 these all influence the global environment. Should they, too, be
subject to democracy? To an extent, of course, they all are. The
democratic state does regulate decisions that seem like individual minutia
until the individual is aggregated into huge environmental impacts.310 But
the democratic question weighing on PEG is not only whether the state
can or should control private governance to some extent, perhaps by
making mandatory those environmental measures that re currently
voluntary.
306 Galperin, The Public Role in Private Governance, supra note 30.
307 See generally Christopher M. Keinath & Srinivas Garimella, An Energy and Cost
Comparison of Residential Water Heating Technologies, 128 ENERGY 626 (2017) (reviewing the
energy impacts of water heating technologies).
308 Eg., Elizabeth M. Cook, Sharon J. Hall, & Kelli L. Larson, Residential Landscapes as
Social-ecological Systems: A Synthesis ofMulti-scalar Interaction Between People and their Home
Environment, 15 URB. ECOSYSTEMS 19, 30 (2012) (noting that residential fertilizer use has an
impact on soil emissions).
309 See Jennifer C. Cole et al., Marketing Energy Efficiency: Perceived Benefits and Barriers to
Home Energy Efficiency, 11 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1811, 1812, 1819 (2018) (identifying home
energy use as a major factor in climate change and studying how consumers reacted to different
light bulb marketing strategies).
310 Eg., 10 C.F.R. Part 429 (regulating consumer products); Minn. Stat. Ann. §18c.60 et. seq.
(banning phosphorus fertilizer on residential lawns).
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The more complicated democratic question that weighs on PEG is
whether the operations of PEG can become more democratic, whether
PEG can integrate democratic practices. This is where the heavier burden
arises because it is absurd to argue that every behavior with
environmental impacts demands a democratic process. When I choose
whether or not to fertilize my lawn, democracy has a role because law
can constrain that decision by prohibiting fertilizer or regulating the types
of fertilizers I use. But, when I act within the constraints of the law,
democracy has no entry into my individual will-when do I fertilize,
which parts of my lawn? My argument in this Article is that democracy
should have entry into the will of at least some PEG, transforming it from
pure will into shared decision making.
Why should PEG be democratic? What is the line that separates some
PEG from ordinary lawn care? Scale and intent are certainly components.
In fact, in a strict sense, my lawn care is PEG because it is not state action
and in the aggregate it has impacts on the global environment. The line is
thus drawn somewhere between discrete behaviors that are orders of
magnitude from having a global impact and intentional strategies that are
designed specifically for global, or at least national, sway. In more
practical terms, the individual or local business falls to one side of the
line while the multinational corporation or industry-wide collaboration
falls on the other. To borrow famous language from Justice Stewart, "I
shall not today attempt to further define the kinds of [PEG] I understand
to be embraced within [the democratic demands of this Article]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when
I see it .... "311 The question of which PEG efforts demand democracy is
an ad hoc assessment. Scale, intent, politics, choice, and liberty are all
factors in the assessment.
The political nature of a PEG endeavor is an important inquiry. Does
the PEG project fill a traditionally governmental role-in the way the
Marine Stewardship Council regulates common pool resources?312 Could
it be part of an effort to influence government policy-in the way a global
retailer might try to avoid deep decarbonization efforts by touting its own
voluntary initiatives? 313
311 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Steward, J., concurring). While lawn care
seems to fall comfortably on one side of the line, global environmental governance falls on the
other, and perhaps an issue like human rights does as well. Surely there are others.
312 Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 3, at 149-50.
313 See Inhofe Statement, supra note 165; Walmart Interview, supra note 165; Corporate
Reluctance, supra note 165 (indicating, together, that corporate efforts might be taken as a good
reason to avoid government regulation).
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If a PEG endeavor presumes collective goals or strategies and has the
ability to make a measurable change, then it may be suitable for
democracy. Thus, the next inquiry is whether the PEG action, or
advocacy for that action, begs the "if' and "how" questions of
environmental protection. Does a project assume a particular
environmental goal is desirable-"if' we want it in the first place-or
that any path to that goal will do-if the goal is desierable "how" will we
achieve it? When I make decisions regarding my lawn, I may consider
the impact on the environment, but environmental protection is not the
purpose, I assume nothing about larger social goals, and in any event, I
imagine most homeowners would have something to say about reducing
nutrient pollution entirely through individual lawn-care decisions while
leaving industrial agricultural pollution unbothered. When I plant, cut,
weed, water, or fertilize, I have no intention of making meaningful
change beyond my yard. The point is that environmental protection is rife
with choices about goals and strategies, but the scale of environmental
problems makes these choices collective rather than individual.
The final inquiry is about liberty. Not all private endeavors, even those
that have political impact or ignore important collective questions, will
have the ability to dominate, interfere, or coerce. In that respect, the
environmental aspect of private environmental governance is an unusual
call to democracy because the environment in which we live is so
essential to what we do, and what we want to do, but also so susceptible
to interference and domination.
The very real politics of PEG, the vast choices that we face in
environmental protection, and the threat to liberty that emerges from
private governance all point to the need for a collective voice that only
democracy can provide. That voice must have at least two roles. The
minor, local, role of remarking on the details of policy, and the major,
global, role of "stand[ing] outside" specific policy tools and considering
what we want.314 In the PEG context, our collective voice might say that
a climate labeling scheme relies on standards that are too lax and
therefore we want more stringency. That is the minor role. Our collective
voice might also say that we do not want a private resolution but a
binding, public one that expressly restricts emissions. Both the
programmatic-local and existential-global roles of voice are central to
democracy, so we are left with a clear charge to determine whether PEG
provides the forum for our collective debate and articulate voice.
Nobody, certainly not the leading proponents of PEG, contend that
they want to trade democracy for private governance. Their argument is
314 KYSAR, supra note 149, at 16.
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that we can only address environmental problems if we pursue public and
private governance in parallel.315 The problem is that this framing
suggests independent endeavors each on a public and a private plane. The
reality is that private and public governance are on the same plane,
dependent and linked together by expressions of public will, past and
present. Public choices have shaped the legal and economic structures
that undergird private power and the political dynamics that pursue or
resist binding environmental law. In turn, PEG shapes public preferences
and influences public and individual decision making. But PEG may not
fully possess the democratic features of majoritarian expression,
individual input, reason giving, and deliberation that undergird public
governance. Without those features, PEG can only marginally and
delicately grasp public will. A marginal and delicate grasp in an
existential struggle to address a titanic public crisis.
Even with only a marginal grasp, each entreaty to PEG has a claim to
bringing us one step-even a small step-closer to resolving the crisis,
but it is no small concern that it does so by relying on private supremacy
quite possibly at the expense of collective power. We can argue the exact
balance of public and private control at the margins, but we cannot argue
this: PEG is fundamentally submissiveness to private power because, if
it were not, PEG would have little claim to instrumental effectiveness. If
there were no power differential, major PEG players would not have the
unusual power to effect instrumental change. We can argue whether or
not submissiveness to private power is desirable. But we should first
consider whether PEG gives us too little occasion for that argument and
no passage, no failsafe, should we decide to escape private dominance.
In the words of Frederick Douglass, "power concedes nothing without
a demand." 316 The democratic mechanisms of the state are a starting point
for making that demand. They do not work well enough, but they can
provide the exit, should we choose it. PEG can bring us closer to some
environmental goal, but without a process for reasoning together we
cannot rightly call it our environmental goal.
315 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 17.
316 Frederick Douglass, West India Emancipation, Speech Delivered at Canandaigua, N.Y.
(Aug. 4, 1857), in LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 426, 437 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1950).
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